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I. INTRODUCTION
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*Assistant Attorney General, Iowa Department of Justice. J.D., University of Iowa College
of Law; B.A., Drake University. In the interest of full disclosure, the author was a clinical
extern in the Iowa Appellate Defender’s Office during law school. The views expressed in
this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the State of Iowa, the Iowa Department of
Justice, or the Attorney General of Iowa. Special thanks to Assistant Attorneys General
Darrel Mullins, Linda Hines, Heather Quick, and Nathan Blake, as well as John Lande, for
thoughtful comments provided during the revision of this piece. The author can be reached
at tyler.buller@gmail.com.
1. As revealed in the study at the heart of this piece, the Iowa Court of Appeals
decided 987 criminal appeals between 2012 and 2013, and the Iowa Supreme Court
retained twenty-one criminal appeals during the same period. This works out to 1,008 cases
over two years, or 504 cases per year.
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In Iowa’s criminal justice system, indigent defendants are
represented by two separate and distinct groups: public
defenders, who are salaried government employees, and courtappointed attorneys, who contract with the state on an hourly
basis. This is an article about their performance on appeal.
Iowa’s appellate courts decide roughly five hundred
criminal appeals every year.1 Most appeals, criminal and
otherwise, are decided by the Court of Appeals, Iowa’s
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intermediate appellate court.2 In each criminal appeal, defense
attorneys face off against assistant attorneys general from the
state Department of Justice’s criminal appeals division. One
might wonder whether the type of criminal defense attorney—
appellate defender, court-appointed attorney, or retained
counsel—makes a difference. Until now, there has been almost
no data to answer that question.
Only one existing study, focusing on New York appeals in
the late 1980s, has meaningfully explored appellate outcomes
based on type of counsel.3 Two subsequent, more-limited studies
found results inconsistent with the New York data.4 Data about
trial-level counsel are similarly a mixed bag, with some studies
showing public defenders are more effective than courtappointed attorneys, some showing the opposite, and some
showing that there are no significant differences.5
The original study contained in this article aims to break
past the noise and provide a clear answer—at least for Iowans—
as to whether the type of counsel matters in a criminal appeal.
The study reports on objective measures of counsel’s
effectiveness: the number of cases in which defendants obtain
favorable outcomes, the number of filings with procedural and
technical problems, the rate at which counsel sought further
review by the Iowa Supreme Court, and the rate at which further
review was granted.
The data show that the appellate defenders generally
perform better than court-appointed lawyers—they win more
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 23 Side B
05/10/2016 12:12:25

2. See generally 2012–2013 Iowa Appellate Courts Statistical Report (noting that the
Court of Appeals disposed of approximately 3,000 appellate cases in the 2012–13 year,
while the Iowa Supreme Court disposed of 213 cases) (on file with author). The numbers
contained in the statistical report do not include cases disposed of by motion practice (e.g.,
a State’s motion to dismiss an appeal or summarily reverse a conviction or sentence). See
IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1006 (2015) (covering dispositional-motion practice), available at https:
//www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/10-29-2015.6.pdf.
3. DAVID T. WASSERMAN, A SWORD FOR THE CONVICTED: REPRESENTING INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS ON APPEAL (1990).
4. Jimmy J. Williams, Type of Counsel and the Outcome of Criminal Appeals: A
Research Note, 19 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 275, 275 (1995) (noting that “type of counsel was
nonsignificant in predicting the court’s decision”); JOY A. CHAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON,
UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR 27–28 (1989) (noting that “winning does not appear
to be strongly associated with . . . the type of lawyer”) [hereinafter REVERSIBLE ERROR].
These studies are discussed in more detail in Part III.
5. See infra Part II.
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cases, have fewer procedural and technical problems, seek
further review in more cases, and obtain further review more
often.6 One particularly striking difference is that, over the
course of two years, court-appointed appellate lawyers never
had a further-review application granted; the appellate defenders
convinced the Supreme Court to take eighteen unfavorable
Court of Appeals decisions on further review. Looking in
another direction, the data also show that representation
provided by the appellate defenders was roughly comparable to
that provided by privately retained defense counsel: Minor
differences appear between the groups, but neither the appellate
defenders nor retained counsel come out clearly ahead on the
objective measures—except for the appellate defenders’
dramatically lower number of procedurally and technically
defective filings.
There is no quick fix that can upgrade court-appointed
attorneys’ performance. But the final section of this piece
suggests a few places to start. Court-appointed attorneys need
better training and better support. Existing prerequisites and
continuing-legal-education requirements for court-appointed
attorneys are not enough. Iowa should explore expanding the
number of appellate defenders to give more defendants more
consistent representation; or, if the present system of court
appointments endures, the State Public Defender should
consider giving the appellate defenders oversight over courtappointed attorneys’ work product. This article explains why.

The focus of this paper and study are relatively narrow:
criminal appeals in the state courts of Iowa. But criminal appeals
are not unique to Iowa—they are present in every state,7 and at
least some research suggests that the broad contours of criminal

05/10/2016 12:12:25

6. See infra Part III(B); Appendix C: Statistical Breakdowns for Outcomes (2012–
2013, All Criminal Appeals).
7. Criminal appeals also occur at the federal level, but those federal cases fall outside
the scope of this article. For a short and accessible introduction to federal criminal appeals,
see Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93
MARQUETTE L. REV. 825 (2009).
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II. CRIMINAL APPEALS IN IOWA
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appeals have “[f]ew striking differences” among the states.8
Because the institutional features of Iowa criminal appeals may
have shaped the results contained in this study, an exploration of
the distinctive make-up of Iowa’s appellate criminal-justice
system is the starting point for understanding whether the type
of counsel makes a difference.
A. The Courts: The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
Unlike nearly all its sister states, Iowa has a deflective
routing system in which all appeals originate in the Supreme
Court, and the overwhelming majority are transferred to the
Court of Appeals for disposition.9 In 2012 and 2013, the
Supreme Court decided10 twenty-one criminal appeals through
retention, while the remaining 987 criminal appeals were
transferred to the Court of Appeals.11 For the overwhelming
majority of criminal defendants, the Court of Appeals is the state
court of first and last resort. Only about five percent of criminal
appeals see action by the Supreme Court: the retained cases
amount to 2.15 percent of all criminal appeals, and another 2.82
percent of criminal appeals are granted further review by the
Supreme Court.12

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 24 Side B
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8. REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 4.
9. See generally IOWA CODE § 602.1102 (2013) (describing structure of judicial
branch); § 602.4102 (2013) (describing jurisdiction of the supreme court, authority to
transfer cases to the court of appeals, and procedure for further review); § 602.5103 (2013)
(describing court of appeals jurisdiction), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/
code/2013/602.pdf. While the Supreme Court of Iowa is created by the Iowa Constitution,
the Court of Appeals is purely a creature of statute. See IOWA CONST. art. V (creating
supreme and district courts, authorizing general assembly to create new inferior courts).
10. When I use the word “decided,” I mean cases that are decided by opinion
(published or unpublished) following formal submission to an appellate court. The figures
contained in this article do not include cases that are disposed of before formal submission
based on a dispositional motion, such as a motion to dismiss, affirm, or reverse.
11. At later points in this article, I refer to the total number of 2012–2013 criminal
appeals as 975 (rather than 987). The statistics calculated in this study are based only on
cases in which counsel appeared on behalf of a criminal defendant; pro se appeals, in
which no counsel entered an appearance, were excluded.
12. In the 2012–2013 sample used in this study (excluding the twelve pro se appeals),
2.82 percent of all criminal appeals were reviewed by the Supreme Court on further
review. See Table 8: Further Review Obtained Following Loss, infra p. 245. Out of 521
applications, just twenty-three were granted further review, for a rate of 4.41 percent. See
id. No pro se applications were granted.
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The court that hears an appeal matters. Iowa’s Supreme
Court, at least according to its own rules, retains only a narrow
band of cases—constitutional challenges to statutes or rules,
cases concerning a conflict among lower courts, “substantial”
issues of first impression, “fundamental and urgent issues of
broad importance,” and cases presenting “substantial” questions
of enunciating or changing legal principles.13 As compared to
Iowa’s Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals is an errorcorrecting court,14 with mandatory rather than discretionary
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals must decide all cases
transferred to it by the Supreme Court and—again, at least
according to the rules—it ordinarily hears cases involving “the
application of existing legal principles” and cases “that are
appropriate for summary disposition.”15
This institutional structure means that the overwhelming
majority of criminal appeals in Iowa have their first and only
hearing before the Court of Appeals. And more than ninety
percent of these cases are decided on the briefs, without oral
argument.16 For this reason, a study of Iowa’s criminal appeals
properly focuses on dispositions before the Court of Appeals
and evaluates features of the briefing process that can be
discerned from publicly accessible documents.
B. The Players:
Varying Defense Counsel against the Attorney General

05/10/2016 12:12:25

13. IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1101(2) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/
ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf. The retention criteria also include lawyerdiscipline appeals, which are not particularly relevant to the discussion of criminal appeals
in this article. IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1101(2)(e).
14. For a broader discussion of appellate courts’ error-correcting function, see
generally Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995); see also REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 27 (referring to
“[t]he primary function of intermediate appellate courts . . . [as] error correction—
examining lower court proceedings to determine the correctness of the law applied and the
procedures followed”).
15. IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1101(3) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/
ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf.
16. In the sample, only ninety out of 975 cases (9.23 percent) involved oral argument.
See Table 21: Oral Argument, infra p. 249.
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The parties in Iowa criminal appeals are predictable: On
one side is the State of Iowa, and on the other is an individual
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criminal defendant or inmate.17 Most cases involve repeat
players (among counsel and sometimes defendants). To
understand the data contained in this article, necessary
background includes the identity of recurring players in the
criminal-appeals arena.
1. Defense Counsel
In Iowa, criminal defendants and prisoners have a statutory
right to counsel in most cases before the appellate courts.18 But
the statute does not guarantee a particular type of defense
attorney. Most criminal defendants are indigent and receive
counsel at public expense.19 Whether a particular defendant is
entitled to counsel at public expense turns on state
administrative rules tied to federal poverty guidelines.20
Like in other states,21 not all attorneys that represent Iowa’s
criminal defendants come from the same background or have the
same attributes. Indigent defendants are represented by two
categories of appellate counsel—either what I refer to as
“appellate defenders” (the government employees dedicated

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 25 Side B
05/10/2016 12:12:25

17. An extremely small number of criminal appeals involve briefs filed by amicus
curiae. Only two cases in this study included an amicus brief. In one, the National Alliance
of State and Territorial AIDS Directors, The Center For HIV Law and Policy, and the HIV
Law Project filed a brief concerning Iowa’s statute criminalizing the knowing failure to
disclose one’s HIV status. Rhoades v. State, 2013 WL 5498141 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013)
vacated and rev’d on further review, 848 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 2014). In the other, the
Innocence Project of Iowa filed a brief urging changes in the law concerning the
preservation of evidence. Alexander v. State, 2013 WL 5291938 at *2 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App.
2013).
18. IOWA CODE § 814.11(1)–(2) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/
code/2013/814.pdf. As is true in the district courts, a criminal defendant is not entitled as a
matter of right to counsel in the “appeal” (really discretionary review) of a simplemisdemeanor conviction.
19. In 2012 and 2013, 86.32 percent of criminal defendants were appointed counsel at
public expense. Counsel was privately retained by 12.46 percent of criminal defendants,
and 1.21 percent of criminal defendants represented themselves pro se. See Table 20: Type
of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Included), infra p. 249.
20. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-10.5 (Dec. 25, 2013) (describing required affidavit of
financial status and setting out procedure for calculating need), available at https://www
.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/12-25-2013.493.pdf.
21. For an overview of general approaches to appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants, see Lauren M. Block, Assignment of Counsel for Indigents, in 1 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 126 (Jay S. Albanese ed., 1st.
ed., 2014) and Robert L. Spangeberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the
United States, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 31 (1995).
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full-time to indigent defense) or “court-appointed attorneys”
(private lawyers who contract with the state to represent indigent
defendants on a part-time hourly basis). Non-indigent
defendants are represented by lawyers they pay for, whom I
refer to in this paper as “retained attorneys.” As discussed
below, the way these groups become involved in criminal
appeals differs, as do their respective workloads. I explore these
differences below because they may, at least in part, explain
differences between the groups on the metrics measured in the
original study.
a. The Appellate Defender’s Office

05/10/2016 12:12:25

22. NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, FINAL EVALUATION OF THE
IOWA APPELLATE DEFENDER (1982) at 3, 5 [hereinafter IAD REPORT ].
23. Id. at 3–6; 81 Iowa Acts ch. 23 (69th G.A.).
24. IAD REPORT, supra note 22, at 6–7.
25. Id. at 6.
26. 1989 Acts. ch. 51, § 2 (73rd G.A.); see generally IOWA CODE Ch. 13B (2013),
available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/13B.pdf.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 26 Side A

The genesis of the Iowa Appellate Defender’s Office was a
1979 report by the Iowa Supreme Court’s Litigation Committee,
which recommended creation of a statewide appellate defense
office.22 Legislation to establish the office was overwhelmingly
advanced by the Iowa General Assembly and signed by
Governor Robert Ray in 1981.23 The only clear point of
contention in the initial legislation was over appointment of the
State Appellate Defender: The Iowa Senate favored he be hired
by a governor-appointed commission while the Iowa House
favored direct appointment by the governor.24 The House
version prevailed and the office was made permanent by
legislation in 1982.25 The statutory scheme for the office today
is similar to that at its origin, though a 1989 amendment
provided for appointment of the State Appellate Defender by the
governor-appointed (and state-senate-confirmed) State Public
Defender, rather than direct appointment of the Appellate
Defender by the governor.26
As explained in a report provided to Iowa’s governor after
the office opened:
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Major objectives of the [Appellate Defender] include
reducing the cost of criminal appeals within the state,
providing property tax relief to local counties by absorbing
costs resulting from indigent criminal appeals, promoting
greater judicial efficiency within the criminal justice
system by reducing unnecessary delays in the
administration of criminal appeals, and promoting the best
interest of justice by providing high quality appellate
27
representation to indigent criminal defendants.

Today, the Appellate Defender (AD)’s Office largely pursues
these same objectives, though its focus has narrowed to purely
state appellate matters—rather than state-district-court litigation
or federal litigation—in the intervening years.28
In terms of personnel, the AD’s Office employed thirteen
full-time attorneys in 2012 and fourteen full-time attorneys in
2013.29 These attorneys, on average, had about twelve years of
experience in the AD’s office, and the amount of criminalappellate experience ranged from two years to forty-one years.30
Each assistant appellate defender is expected to handle between
thirty-five and forty cases per year.31 Appellate defenders are

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 26 Side B
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27. IAD REPORT, supra note 22, at App. F-3 p. 1.
28. Compare IAD REPORT, supra note 22, at 6 & 11 (requiring the AD’s Office to
handle postconviction matters before the district courts) with IOWA CODE § 13B.11 (2013)
(requiring state appellate defender to “represent indigents on appeal in criminal cases and
on appeal in proceedings to obtain postconviction relief when appointed to do so by the
district court”), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/13B.pdf, and
Email from Kurt Swaim, First Assistant State Public Defender, Questions Re: AD for Law
Review Article (Dec. 12, 2014) (transmitting State Appellate Defender Mark Smith’s
responses to author’s questions about State Appellate Defender’s policies and practices)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Swaim December Email] (both noting that, today, the
AD’s office represents criminal defendants only on direct or interlocutory appeals in
criminal cases, appeals from a denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, appeals
from probation or parole revocation proceedings, and appeals from the denial of an
application for postconviction relief). The only time the AD’s office appears in federal
court would be United States Supreme Court certiorari review of a state-court decision. See
Attachment to Swaim December Email (on file with author). The chief appellate defender
reports that his office has only participated in one United States Supreme Court case over
the last decade. See id.
29. Swaim December Email, supra note 28. For both years, the office also had four
full-time support staff. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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salaried, rather than paid hourly, and the pay scale ranged from
$48,505 to $111,820 as of June, 2013.32
Under the Iowa Code, the Appellate Defender is appointed
to all criminal appeals originating in the district court, and then
has the opportunity to withdraw.33 Decisions about when to
withdraw are not purely random. According to the chief
appellate defender,34 during the period explored in this study the
office’s practice was to “take all cases [it] can reasonably
handle,” other than conflicts.35 The chief appellate defender
reports that, when the office has to withdraw for workload
reasons, the office will “generally withdraw from the less
serious cases—driving offenses, OWI, simple possession.”36 He
also indicated the office strives to avoid withdrawing from Class
A felonies, other than for conflict reasons.37 As discussed at
length in Part V.D below, however, the chief appellate
defender’s description about the office’s withdrawal practices is
not entirely consistent with the data collected for 2012 and 2013.
b. Court-Appointed Attorneys
Indigent defendants who are not represented by the
appellate defenders, and who do not elect to retain paid counsel,
are represented by court-appointed attorneys. Under the State
Public Defender (SPD)’s 2012–2013 rules, court-appointed
attorneys in criminal appeals were paid $60 an hour, unless a
contract with the SPD specified otherwise.38 Attorneys could not
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 27 Side A
05/10/2016 12:12:25

32. Email from Steven Ainger, Classification & Compensation Program Coordinator,
Iowa Dep’t of Admin. Servs., Question about June, 2013 Asst. Appellate Defender Salary
Range (Jan. 29, 2016) (responding to author’s request for confirmation of 2013 salary
information no longer available on DAS website) (on file with author).
33. IOWA CODE § 814.11(3) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code
/2013/814.pdf.
34. For clarity and consistency, I use “chief appellate defender” in this article to refer to
the Iowa State Appellate Defender, who leads the Appellate Defender’s Office and
supervises assistant appellate defenders.
35. Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note 28.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.4 (addressing rates in general), R. 493-124.4(3)
(excepting contracted-for appellate rates from limits imposed by rule) (Dec. 25, 2013),
available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/12-25-2013.493.pdf. This same
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bill for clerical work, overheard, preparation of indigent-defense
fee claims, or challenges to the SPD’s denial of a fee claim.39
And travel time to visit a client was only payable when the
travel was “reasonable and necessary” to the representation.40
During the time period evaluated in this study, a fee cap of
$2,400 was imposed on criminal appeals.41 An attorney could
exceed this amount only after obtaining a court order
authorizing a fee in excess of the cap.42
The State Public Defender did not maintain statistics
concerning the experience of court-appointed attorneys during
the period explored in this study.43
c. Privately Retained Counsel
In Iowa, as is true elsewhere in the country, a small cadre
of criminal defendants are represented by privately retained
counsel, paid for by the defendant or his family. For purposes of
this study, little information was available about the
characteristics of this group of attorneys,44 other than the relative
infrequency at which retained counsel appears in the sample.45

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 27 Side B
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rate was applicable for the period of the study. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE. R. 493-12.4 (May
30, 2012), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/05-30-2012.493.pdf.
39. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.5(3) (June 25, 2014), available at https://www.legis
.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/06-25-2014.493.pdf; accord IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-7.1
(Apr. 6, 2011) (defining terms including “in-court time,” “out-of-court time,” and
“paralegal time”), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/04-06-2011.49
3.pdf.
40. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.5(4)(c) (June 25, 2014), available at https://www
.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/06-25-2014.493.pdf.
41. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.6(3) (May 30, 2012), available at https://www.legis
.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/05-30-2012.493.pdf. The 2014 rule abolishes that limit. IOWA
ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.6(3) (June 25, 2014), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/
docs/iac/agency/06-25-2014.493.pdf.
42. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.6(4) (May 30, 2012), available at https://www
.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/05-30-2012.493.pdf.
43. See Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note 28.
44. For example, no entity tracks information about the experience and workload of
retained counsel because retained counsel are not accountable to the State or the State
Public Defender. Retained counsel are accountable only to their clients and to market
forces.
45. Only 12.46 percent of all criminal defendants were represented by privately
retained counsel in 2012–2013 appeals. See Table 20: Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se
Included), infra p. 249. Among the sample of appeals in which defendants were
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2. The Attorney General’s Criminal Appeals Division
Unlike defense counsel, who represent a number of
different clients in the course of their careers, the State is
represented in each and every criminal appeal by an assistant
attorney general in the criminal appeals division of the Iowa
Department of Justice.46 Under the Iowa Code, the Attorney
General has sole responsibility for all criminal appeals before
Iowa’s appellate courts.47 County attorneys cannot and do not
appear as counsel of record in these cases.48
The State’s typical role in a criminal appeal is as the
appellee, defending a district court judgment. The State is also
authorized to appeal as a matter of right in certain limited
circumstances, including dismissal or other legal judgment on an
indictment, an order arresting judgment, or an order granting a
new trial.49 The State has authority to seek discretionary review
in an array of cases, including orders dismissing an arrest or
search warrant, an order suppressing evidence, an order granting
or denying change of venue, or any final judgment or order
“raising a question of law important to the judiciary and the

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 28 Side A
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represented by counsel, retained counsel appear in 12.62 percent of appeals. See Table 19:
Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Excluded), infra p. 249.
46. As a result of increased workload during the period studied in this article, the State
was represented by volunteer attorneys from other divisions of the Attorney General’s
office in approximately thirty-nine cases, or around four percent of criminal appeals in the
sample. However, even when briefs were written by other-division volunteers (or division
interns), briefs were reviewed by criminal-appeals staff before they were filed with the
appellate courts.
47. IOWA CODE § 13.2(1)(a) (2013) (declaring that “[i]t shall be the duty of the
attorney general, except as otherwise provided by law to . . . [p]rosecute and defend all
causes in the appellate courts in which the state is a party or interested”), available at https:
//www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/13.pdf.
48. In re A.W., 741 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Iowa 2007) (“Absent a specific statutory
directive to the contrary, county attorneys’ appearances in the appellate courts are limited
to representation of the interests of the county [rather than the State].”); State v. Gill, 143
N.W.2d 331, 332 (Iowa 1966) (“Ordinarily, a criminal case is under the control of the
county attorney until the supreme court acquires jurisdiction, after which it is under the
sole control of the attorney general.”).
49. IOWA CODE § 814.5(1) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/814.pdf.
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profession.”50 The State may also appeal discretionary
reductions of certain mandatory-minimum sentences.51
C. The Appeals: Direct Appeals of Convictions
and Postconviction-Relief Appeals
At least as it relates to this study,52 there are two types of
criminal appeals in Iowa: a direct appeal following conviction,
and an appeal from the denial of postconviction relief following
an unsuccessful application.
A direct appeal is initiated by a criminal defendant filing a
notice of appeal in the district court and in the Supreme Court of
Iowa within thirty days of a final judgment—usually
sentencing.53 All criminal convictions, other than a simple
misdemeanor or ordinance-violation conviction, may be
appealed as a matter of right.54 Over the 2012 and 2013 calendar
years, direct appeals made up a majority of criminal appeals:
768 out of 975 appeals included in this study, or 78.77 percent
of criminal appeals.
A postconviction-relief (PCR) appeal is initiated by a
convicted criminal defendant55 filing a notice of appeal in the
district court, also within thirty days of a final judgment—
usually an order denying postconviction relief.56 The right to
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50. IOWA CODE § 814.5(2) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/814.pdf.
51. IOWA CODE § 901.10(4) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code
/2013/901.pdf.
52. As discussed in more detail in Part IV, the population of “criminal appeals” studied
in this article includes both direct appeals of criminal convictions and sentences, and
appeals of postconviction-relief actions that challenge criminal convictions, which are
technically civil in nature. See infra Part IV: The Original Study.
53. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.101(1)(b) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/
docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf.
54. IOWA CODE § 814.6 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/814.pdf. A simple misdemeanor or ordinance violation may be “appealed” by seeking
discretionary review. IOWA CODE § 814.6(2)(d) (2013).
55. These convicted criminal defendants are referred to as “applicants” in the captions
of PCR cases. See generally IOWA CODE ch. 822 (2013) (describing application for
postconviction relief and application process), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov
/docs/code/2013/822.pdf.
56. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.101(1)(b) (2013).
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postconviction relief in Iowa is purely a creature of statute57 and
the grounds specified in the Code include constitutional claims,
sentencing issues, and newly discovered evidence, among
others.58 Importantly, and unlike the system in some other states,
ineffective-assistance claims in Iowa are “ordinarily” preserved
for postconviction relief.59 An ineffective-assistance claim need
not be raised on direct appeal and can be raised for the first time
in an application for postconviction relief.60 An unsuccessful
postconviction-relief application may be appealed by the
defendant/applicant, and the State may appeal the grant of
postconviction relief as a matter of right.61 Postconviction-relief
appeals constitute a distinct minority of appeals included in this
study: 207 out of 975 appeals, or 21.23 percent.
Before proceeding to the narrow focus of this study—the
effect of appellate counsel on appeal outcomes—it is useful to
place Iowa’s overall criminal-appeals statistics in a broader
context. There is no systematic breakdown of criminal appeals
nationwide that shows the type of appellate reversal and the rate
at which each occurs. One of the few sources for a glimpse of
this data comes from a report published in 1989 by the National
Center for State Courts that looked at criminal appeals before
four intermediate appellate courts (in California, Colorado,
Illinois, and Maryland) and one state court of last resort (in
Rhode Island, which lacks an intermediate appellate court).62
The graph on the next page shows the differences and
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A
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57. What is now Iowa Code Chapter 822, previously Chapter 663A, “supplanted”
Iowa’s common-law habeas remedy for convicted persons. See Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d
707, 709 (Iowa 1989).
58. IOWA CODE § 822. 2 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/822.pdf.
59. E.g., State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012) (noting that the Iowa
Supreme Court will “ordinarily preserve such claims for postconviction relief
proceedings”); accord State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003) (“Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are generally preserved for post-conviction relief.”).
60. IOWA CODE § 814.7 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/814.pdf.
61. IOWA CODE § 822.9 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/822.pdf.
62. REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 3 n.*; see also James W. Meeker, Criminal
Appeals Over the Last 100 Years, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 551 (1984) (indicating that defendants
in the early-to-mid twentieth century were less likely to “win” on appeal than in the mid-tolate nineteenth century).
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63. The NCSC dataa are tabulated diffferently from thee data used in thiss study. About 4..8
percen
nt of the outcomees reported in th
he NCSC report do not directly correspond to thhe
senten
ncing-outcome co
oding used here. See REVERSIBLEE ERROR, supra note 4, at 35–336
(includ
ding graph catego
ories “Win nothin
ng,” “Affirmed/reeversed,” “Resenttencing,” “Other,,”
“Reverrsed/dismissed,” and “Reversed/n
new trial”). For thhe data used to ccompile the grapph
on thiss page, see Table 22: Comparison of Iowa and NCS
SC Data, infra p. 250.
64. The research methodology
m
forr tabulating the type of reversaal and its rate iis
discussed at length in Part
P IV.A.3.a and
d the coding rubriic is included at ppages 236 througgh
240 in Appendix A.
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modification. Yet the breakdown on types of favorable action is
also remarkably consistent between the Iowa data and the NCSC
data. Though no statistical inferences can or should be drawn
from this abbreviated comparison, the data suggest that
criminal-appeal outcomes in Iowa are similar to those in other
states. This, in turn, suggests that the data collected in the
original study contained in Part IV may be applicable beyond
Iowa’s borders, given the similar baseline for overall appellate
outcomes.
III. EXISTING RESEARCH ON DIFFERENCES IN
APPELLATE COUNSEL

05/10/2016 12:12:25

65. WASSERMAN, supra note 3. CAB, an arm of New York City’s Legal Aid Society,
operated as the institutional appellate defender because its contract provided that it was
appointed for all indigent appellate representation, except for conflict cases. Id. at 44.
66. Id. at 92.
67. Id. at 65, 81.
68. Id. at 81.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 30 Side A

One of few studies exploring the impact of different
appellate counsel was Wasserman’s 1990 New York study,
which compared briefing and outcomes between cases handled
by an institutional appellate defender—the Criminal Appeals
Bureau—and the conflict cases handled by court-appointed
attorneys.65 Wasserman looked at 1,410 appellate cases,66 and
his study had two components: one based on a qualitative
evaluation of the briefs and one based on a quantitative
evaluation of appeal outcomes. As to the briefs, Wasserman had
eight retired appellate judges blindly review briefs filed by both
CAB and the appointed attorneys. The judges rated the CAB
briefs “modestly but consistently higher” than appointed
attorneys’ briefs, and the judges found that as many as one
quarter of the appointed attorneys’ briefs failed to raise
meritorious issues, compared to just one of the CAB briefs.67
The judges also found that the appointed attorneys’ briefs were
more likely to raise frivolous issues than the CAB briefs.68
The quantitative data collected by Wasserman also
supported a difference between defenders, with some nuance.
Wasserman collected the total number of cases in which
defenders of both types obtained “favorable action” for their
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Id. at 90.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 98–99.
Id.
Id. at 65 (outlining study’s structure and summarizing its results).
Id. at 115–131, 130.
Id. at 131.

05/10/2016 12:12:25

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 30 Side B

clients, including reversal and dismissal, the grant of a new trial,
dismissal of lesser-included offenses, correction of sentencing
error, and other remands.69 He found that CAB obtained
favorable action in 11.82 percent of cases, appointed attorneys
obtained favorable action in 7.91 percent of cases, and privately
retained counsel did so in 17.88 percent of cases.70 The
differences between CAB and the appointed attorneys were
statistically significant, as were the differences between those
attorneys and the privately retained attorneys.71 The greatest
differences between CAB and appointed attorneys were for the
grant of a new trial and for re-sentencing, while CAB and
appointed attorneys had identical rates of dismissals/acquittals.72
For sentencing reductions, CAB actually outperformed retained
counsel: 2.68 percent of CAB clients obtained sentencing
modifications, compared to 2.1 percent of retained-counsel
clients.73
Ultimately, Wasserman concluded that “a defendant was
more likely to prevail on appeal if he was assigned to CAB,
because of its superior representation.”74 He devoted a chapter
of his book to ruling out alternative causes for CAB’s success:
He looked at CAB’s selection procedures and found no evidence
of deliberate manipulation in case-screening, and limited support
for any merit-based bias—such as an advantage possibly
conveyed by the discretion accorded CAB in applying the
conflict-of-interest rules—in selection of appeals.75 Further,
Wasserman’s analysis of the data established that, even if there
was a bias in selection, this could not account for all the
variance in the performance of CAB versus the appointed
attorneys.76
As partial explanation for these findings, Wasserman’s
investigation revealed that there was “much fuller support for
the city’s institutional defenders than for its assigned defenders,”
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77. Id. at 44–45.
78. Id. at 44–45, 52.
79. Id. at 45.
80. Id. at 99.
81. Id. at 63.
82. REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 40
83. Williams, supra note 4. Based on his results, Williams reasoned that indigent
defendants were not afforded inferior counsel, in part because the prevailing perception
among judges is that most criminal appeals are “frivolous, hopeless, and routine.” Id. at
282 (citations omitted).

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 31 Side A

particularly in terms of a predictable salary, paid support staff,
and covered office expenses.77 In contrast to the CAB, appointed
attorneys were paid at an hourly rate that worked out to
significantly less than the institutional defenders’ salary,78 they
were not reimbursed for rent or support staff, and they paid for
their own office supplies.79 He extrapolated from his data that
the quality of advocacy makes a big difference in certain
cases—like the grant of a new trial or sentencing correction—in
which outcomes are “more dependent on skilled advocacy” than
the “mechanical” type of analysis related to obtaining a
dismissal of an indictment for a speedy-trial violation or other
elementary reasons.80
When Wasserman wrote in 1990, “[e]mpirical research on
the impact of appellate advocacy [was] virtually non-existent.”81
The landscape has changed little since then. Only two notable
additions appear in the literature, and they raise more questions
than they provide answers. First, the National Center for State
Courts study rejected Wasserman’s claim that appellate counsel
makes a difference in the overall rate of favorable action, and
found “weak” statistical support for the notion that public
defenders win “bigger” than court-appointed attorneys.82
Second, a short study of Florida appellate decisions found that
the assignment of counsel (whether a public defender or a courtappointed attorney) was not a significant factor in predicting
appellate outcomes.83
Looking beyond the impact of counsel on appeal, there is a
body of research exploring whether type of counsel makes a
difference for criminal defendants at the trial level. The results
of these studies, however, are mixed. A 1982 study of 48,000
trial-level case records in Virginia found that public defenders
were more likely to obtain dismissals for their clients and that
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their trials were less likely to result in a guilty verdict.84 That
study also found that privately retained counsel performed better
than either type of indigent counsel on the same measures.85
Other studies have found that retained counsel are more likely to
obtain deferred dispositions,86 and that retained counsel take
more cases to trial and obtain proportionally more acquittals.87
Still other data show retained counsel filed more motions than
court-appointed attorneys,88 and that retained counsel visited
clients sooner after arrest.89
A number of studies also explore whether sentencing
outcomes vary across types of counsel. One 2005 study found
the type of representation “slightly significant” (at ten percent
confidence) between private and public-expense counsel, and
found that public defenders obtain sentences that are 8.9 months
shorter than those obtained by private counsel.90 Another study,
released the same year, found that public defenders underperformed retained counsel and court-appointed attorneys in
sentencing outcomes.91 The study attributed this difference to
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84. See LARRY J. COHEN, ET AL., ASSIGNED COUNSEL VS. PUBLIC DEFENDER
SYSTEMS IN VIRGINIA (1982). Specifically, the study found that thirty-five percent of the
public defenders’ cases involved a dismissal, while the rate was only twenty-six percent for
court-appointed attorneys. Id. at 35. Of note, this statistic includes cases in which the
prosecutor ultimately declined to file further charges or declined to proceed on the
indictment. Id.
85. The study found that retained counsel obtained dismissals in 46.2 percent of cases
and only 50 percent of cases with retained counsel resulted in a guilty verdict. Id.
86. Joyce S. Sterling, Retained Counsel Versus the Public Defender: The Impact of
Type of Counsel on Charge Bargaining, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 151, 160–62 (William
McDonald, ed., 1983). The same research shows, however, that public defenders obtain
more charge reductions. See id. at 161–62.
87. Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases,
Prior Records, and Leniency in Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253 (1989).
88. Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New
York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 766–70 (1986–87).
89. See ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND
DONE WELL (1992).
90. Elaine L. Hill, Does the Type of Legal Representation Affect Sentencing Outcomes?
1 UNDERGRAD. ECON. REV. 17 (2005).
91. Morris B. Hoffman, Paul H. Rubin, & Joanna M. Shepherd, An Empirical Study of
Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the “Marginally Indigent”, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 223, 242 (2005) (including figures 4 and 5). Like the study presented in this
article, the Hoffman, Rubin, & Shepherd piece divides counsel into three groups: public
defenders, court-appointed attorneys, and retained counsel. Id. at 233–34. The specific
findings of the study were that public defenders’ clients received nearly five years longer
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terms of imprisonment than the average private attorneys’ clients and court-appointed
attorneys’ clients. Id. at 241–44.
92. See id. at 245–50.
93. Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense
Counsel 8–11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007),
available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/iyengarr/indigent_defense.pdf .
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Id. at 28.
97. Michael A. Roach, Indigent Defense Counsel, Attorney Quality, and Defendant
Outcomes, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 577 (2014).
98. Id. at 598.
99. Id. at 602.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 607.
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“marginally indigent” defendants retaining counsel in cases in
which representation might affect the outcome.92
An unpublished study from 2007 explored differences in
trial-level outcomes in the federal arena, where representation
was essentially random.93 The study found that clients of
attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act were found
guilty 2.6 percent more often than clients represented by the
federal public defender,94 and those court-appointed attorneys’
clients received prison terms that were seven months longer on
average.95 In other words, the study found that federal public
defenders obtain better outcomes. The author of this study
posited that, at least in part, these differences can be explained
by the federal public defenders having stronger academic
credentials, more experience, and better wages.96
Another study, from 2011, showed similar results.97 The
2011 study looked at an assortment of counties and controlled
for variables that were not consistent between states, like offense
type.98 The study found that clients of court-appointed attorneys
were 2.8 percent more likely to be found guilty, were 5.2 percent
more likely to be convicted on the most serious count of the
indictment, and were on average sentenced to longer terms of
incarceration.99 Their cases also took longer to resolve from
arrest to adjudication.100 This study also found that a one-dollar
increase in the hourly pay of some types of court-appointedattorneys correlated with shorter expected sentences.101
More recently, a 2012 study explored differences in
outcomes between court-appointed attorneys and public
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IV. THE ORIGINAL STUDY
To explore whether the type of representation makes a
difference in Iowa criminal appeals, I designed an original

05/10/2016 12:12:25

102. James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012).
103. Id. at 159.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 159, 179–84.
106. See Ronald F. Wright & Ralph A. Peeples, Criminal Defense Lawyer Moneyball: A
Demonstration Project, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221, 1240 (2013) (describing the results
of existing research as “varied” and “conflicting”).
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defenders in Philadelphia.102 The Philadelphia study provides
one of the better analyses, as it’s based on a system that is
almost purely random: Every fifth person charged with murder
in Philadelphia is assigned to the public defender’s office at
arraignment, while the remainder are represented by courtappointed attorneys.103 The results “suggest that defense counsel
makes an enormous difference in the outcomes of cases, even in
the most serious cases—in which one might hope that the
particular type of defense lawyer would matter least.”104
Contrasted with appointed counsel, the public defenders’ clients
were nineteen percent less likely to be convicted of murder, their
clients were sixty-two percent less likely to receive a life
sentence, and their clients who received prison sentences served
twenty-four percent less time.105
These studies, and others not cited here, fail to paint a clear
picture.106 If anything, the take-away from the existing research
is that the data are inconsistent and any meta-analysis would be
muddled. Some studies find public defenders are more
“effective” (measured in various ways) than court-appointed
attorneys and public defenders, while others come to the
opposite conclusion or express inconsistent findings. These
studies, almost universally, focus on trial-level results. No study,
other than Wasserman’s in 1990, has conclusively explored the
effectiveness of indigent counsel at the appellate level and
differentiated among types of appellate outcomes. The original
study discussed in the next part aims to fill this gap using data
from cases before the Iowa Court of Appeals.
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empirical study to compare litigation conducted by appellate
defenders, court-appointed attorneys, and retained counsel. I lay
out the methodology and coding scheme below, and I include
the coding rubric in the appendix, to enable replication.
A. Methodology
From the outset, I confess I was not designing an
experiment on a blank slate. The variables I chose to measure,
and the formation of my initial hypotheses, were no doubt
colored by my anecdotal experience as an appellate prosecutor. I
frequently prosecute cases in which I face different types of
counsel, and it would be disingenuous to suggest that some bias
did not pre-dispose my views when conducting the study. To
mitigate any preconceptions I may have had, the measures relied
on in completing this study are only those that can be
empirically verified and objectively demonstrated by a search of
publicly available court dockets and opinions available on the
Iowa judicial branch website.
I designed the study to encompass two calendar years of
criminal cases before the Iowa Court of Appeals, including
direct criminal appeals and postconviction cases. As described
below, I relied on publicly available sources to collect data
related to each individual case included in the study.
1. Sample Selection

05/10/2016 12:12:25

107. Slip opinions dating back to 1998 are available on the judicial branch website. See
Opinion Archive, IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.iowacourts.gov/
About _the _Courts/Court _ of _ Appeals/Court _of _ Appeals _Opinions/Opinions _Archive/
(accessed Dec. 10, 2015; copy of main search page on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process). I did not use a “term” system (as compared to a “calendar” system)
to determine the sample because Iowa’s Court of Appeals does not follow a publicly
announced term system.
108. Some cases were posted twice following a successful petition for rehearing; in that
situation, only the final disposition of the case is accounted for in the study’s data.
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In defining the parameters of the study, I relied on the Iowa
judicial branch website to create a list of decisions issued by the
Court of Appeals between January 1, 2012 and December 31,
2013.107 I removed duplicate cases from my sample, after
reviewing both opinions.108 I reviewed all cases that listed the
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State of Iowa as a party and omitted non-criminal cases, such as
tort cases against the State, disputes related to Department of
Corrections policy or procedures, and juvenile cases. I also
removed appeals by the State109 and cases that solely concerned
commitments of persons as sexually violent predators (SVPs),
even though SVP cases are handled in the district court by the
Attorney General’s area prosecutions division, and later
defended by the criminal appeals division after a verdict.110
2. Hypotheses

1. The appellate defenders more frequently obtain
favorable outcomes for clients.

05/10/2016 12:12:25

109. See generally Table 23: State/Attorney General as Litigant, infra p. 250, for some
relevant statistics concerning State’s appeals.
110. No SVPs obtained favorable outcomes before the Court of Appeals in 2012 or
2013. In all seventeen SVP appeals, respondents facing commitment as sexually violent
predators were represented by attorneys from the State Public Defender’s Special Defense
Unit. And in all seventeen cases, the jury verdict or court judgment was affirmed. As
relevant to the statistics compiled for this study, the public defenders sought further review
in 11.76 percent of cases and obtained further review in none. The rates of stricken filings
and defaults were both 5.88 percent in SVP cases. Although the comparison is not neat—
SVP cases differ from criminal appeals in a number of ways—these data points put the
Special Defense Unit lawyers’ performance much closer to the performance of courtappointed attorneys than to that of the appellate defenders. See infra Parts IV.B.1–IV.B.4.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 33 Side B

Based on the available data, and the limited number of nonsubjective potential metrics, I formed hypotheses in four areas
concerning the effectiveness of appellate counsel. First, the
number of favorable outcomes—the bottom line for defendants
who want a “win” on appeal to obtain a new trial, reduce their
sentencing exposure, or obtain an acquittal. Second, the number
of technical or procedural defects in the parties’ filings, as
reflected in public docket entries. Third, whether counsel fully
exhausted the appellate process, preserving potential federal
habeas claims for their clients by seeking further review. And
fourth, whether lawyers that received unfavorable outcomes
before the Court of Appeals were able to successfully obtain
further review by the Supreme Court.
Based on my desire to investigate these four areas, I made
the following hypotheses comparing the appellate defenders and
court-appointed attorneys:
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2. The appellate defenders have fewer technical and
procedural problems litigating before the appellate
courts.
3. The appellate defenders more frequently exhaust
the state appellate process by seeking further
review.
4. The appellate defenders more frequently obtain
further review by the Supreme Court following an
unfavorable outcome.
I did not form a specific hypothesis about the performance
of the appellate defenders as compared to retained counsel
(given that I expected comparatively few retained-counsel
appeals in the sample period). However, my expectation before
completing the study was in line with Wasserman’s findings and
the conventional wisdom that retained counsel generally
perform better than indigent counsel, whether court-appointed or
part of an institutional defender system.111
3. Coding

05/10/2016 12:12:25

111. The comparatively higher performance of retained counsel could be based on a
variety of factors including that their cases involve “fewer violent crimes, more
sympathetic clients, and greater possibilities for error in more complex cases.”
WASSERMAN, supra note 3, at 89. Wasserman posits, I think correctly, that the greatest
advantage for retained counsel is the self-selection of cases by both attorney and client:
Retained attorneys can turn down hopeless cases and their clients are unlikely to pay
potentially substantial legal fees for appeals that do not have at least some probability of
success. See id. at 89.
112. The rubric included at Appendix A is substantially similar to the rubric used during
the coding process, with better proofreading and without handwritten reminders in the
margin. The only exception is in the coding rules for the severity of the offense; this was
done separately and subsequent to the initial coding, based on additional information from
the chief appellate defender. See Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note 28.
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To compile the statistics at the heart of this piece, I
designed a coding rubric to use while reviewing individual
judicial opinions and Iowa appellate-court dockets. The full
coding rubric is included as Appendix A.112 The rubric was used
to record raw data into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, which
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was later reviewed for data cleanup—misspellings, data
recorded in the wrong column, and the like.113
Coding in the individual areas is explained in broad strokes
below. This information, combined with the rubric in Appendix
A, should be sufficient for any independent researcher to verify
my findings.
a. Coding for Outcome

05/10/2016 12:12:25

113. The raw data spreadsheet is on file with the author.
114. A dismissal is equivalent to an affirmance because they have the same practical
effect: The original judgment (conviction or sentence) is left intact.
115. “New trial” is the default coding for any non-sentencing reversal because the Iowa
Code provides that, “[i]f a judgment against the defendant is reversed, such reversal shall
be deemed an order for a new trial, unless the appellate court shall direct a different
disposition.” IOWA CODE § 814.22 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs
/code/2013/814.pdf. Consistent with this section, I coded outcomes as “acquittals” only if
that outcome was directed by the Court of Appeals opinion.
116. Iowa’s appellate courts have authority to either directly modify a sentence on
appeal (to reduce it) or remand the case for a district court judge to enter an order
modifying a sentence. See IOWA CODE § 814.20 (2013) (“The appellate court, after an
examination of the entire record, may dispose of the case by affirmation, reversal or

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 34 Side B

Outcomes were coded in two ways: once broadly and once
narrowly. The broad categorization was for whether the outcome
was favorable or unfavorable to the defendant. Unfavorable
outcomes, from the perspective of a criminal defendant, include
cases in which the judgment is either affirmed in whole or the
appeal is dismissed.114 All other outcomes were classified as
favorable.
The basis for the outcome-coding decision was the full text
of the judicial opinion published on the judicial branch website.
All opinions include a bolded directive concerning outcome at
the end of the opinion, though often this is abbreviated and only
makes sense in the context of the preceding language in the
opinion. Coding for the particular type of favorable outcome
was governed by the rules set forth in the coding rubric. In short,
three types of outcomes were coded: “acquitted” if the Court of
Appeals reversed for dismissal or otherwise vacated a conviction
with jeopardy; “new trial” if a new trial was ordered or a
reversal was ordered without the attachment of jeopardy;115 and
“re-sentenced” if a sentence was modified or remanded for a
new sentencing hearing.116
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b. Coding for Procedural and Technical Defects
There is generally no clear statement in judicial opinions as
to whether a party has failed to comply with procedural rules
concerning appellate practice,117 but the Iowa Courts Online
docket for appeals does contain several cues that provide a
barometer for these deficiencies. Based on the information
available in the online docketing system, I tracked cases in
which the clerk of appellate courts or a single-justice order118
struck defense filings, required defense counsel to re-file
documents, or entered a default and fine for failure to comply
with the rules. For purposes of coding, documents were coded as
“stricken” if they were stricken by an order or if a letter from the
clerk compelled counsel to file amended documents. A default
was coded only in circumstances in which the court formally
entered an order of default, and a default was not coded when
the default was formally withdrawn by a subsequent order or
notation by the clerk’s staff.
c. Coding for Further-Review Applications and FurtherReview Grants and Denials

05/10/2016 12:12:25

modification of the district court judgment. The appellate court may also . . . reduce the
punishment, but shall not increase it.”), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/814.pdf.
117. On occasion, opinions do include a comment about procedural and technical
defects. See, e.g., State v. Lange, 831 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Rule
infractions are not a trivial matter.”).
118. The overwhelming majority of non-dispositional orders before the Iowa Supreme
Court are single-justice orders. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1002(5) (2013) (providing that “a
single justice or senior judge of the supreme court may entertain any motion in an appeal or
original proceeding in the supreme court and grant or deny any relief which may properly
be sought by motion, except that a single justice or senior judge may not dismiss, affirm,
reverse, or otherwise determine an appeal or original proceeding”), available at https:
//www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf.
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Coding for data concerning applications for further review
was based solely on the online appellate docket. The docketing
system records when an application is filed and who files the
application. These records allow for coding based on whether an
application was filed by counsel or by a defendant pro se. Only
applications made by counsel were recorded. The docketing
system also records the disposition of an application through an
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order issued by the chief justice—it will list the application as
either “granted” or “denied,” and the data was coded
accordingly.
d. Coding for Offense Severity
Given the chief appellate defender’s statement about the
office’s withdrawal process,119 I also coded each appeal for
offense severity. Because many criminal defendants are
convicted of multiple crimes, I based offense-severity coding on
the top count (most severe offense) for which a defendant was
originally convicted in the district court.
Coding was based on the hierarchy of offenses laid out in
the Iowa Code. Iowa has four broad classifications of felonies—
Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D—that generally
correspond to the punishments of life in prison, twenty-five
years in prison, ten years in prison, and five years in prison,
respectively.120
There
are
three
classifications
of
misdemeanors—aggravated, serious, and simple—that generally
correspond to two years in prison, one year in the county jail,
and thirty days in the county jail, respectively.121 The coding for
this study does not reflect the handful of offenses that deviate
from these general punishments,122 or crimes that potentially
carry enhancements, unless the enhancement elevates the felony
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 35 Side B
05/10/2016 12:12:25

119. See supra Part II.B.1.a; see also Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note
28 (noting the AD withdrew from Class A felonies only when the office could not
undertake representation due to a conflict, that the AD staff “try to keep the more serious
cases,” and that the office tries to “generally withdraw from the less serious cases—driving
offenses, OWI, simple possession”).
120. IOWA CODE § 902.9 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/902.pdf.
121. IOWA CODE § 903.1 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/903.pdf.
122. For example, while second-degree murder is a Class B felony, it carries a
punishment of fifty years in prison, rather than twenty-five years. See IOWA CODE
§ 707.3(2) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/707.pdf. On
the other end of the spectrum, possession of marijuana (first offense) is a serious
misdemeanor with a reduced maximum sentence of six months in jail, rather than one year.
See IOWA CODE § 124.401(5) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/124.pdf.
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classification (rather than only modifying the applicable
penalty).123
I caution the reader that, if reliability concerns are present
anywhere in my data, it is likely here. Unlike the procedure that
involves following relatively explicit cues for the other coding
segments, coding for offense severity takes some detective
work. Judicial opinions rarely contain an explicit statement that
a criminal defendant has been convicted of Crime X, a Class Y
felony. I based my coding on this information where it was
available. For opinions that included a clear statement of the
conviction at issue without identifying the severity of the
offense, I used the sentencing charts utilized by Iowa
practitioners to look up the corresponding offense’s severity
based on code section and the name of the crime.124 Where there
was ambiguity as to the offense at issue or where the name of
the offense alone was not sufficient to determine an offense
level,125 I used Iowa Courts Online126 to find how the district
court clerk had docketed the adjudication on the top count and
used that information.127 For a handful of postconviction cases,
district court dockets were not clear or incomplete,128 and I

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 36 Side A
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123. Compare IOWA CODE § 902.14 (2013) (elevated penalty classification for sexcrime offenders), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/902.pdf with
IOWA CODE ch. 901A (2013) (enhanced penalties for sexually predatory offenses, no
increase in offense classification), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/901A.pdf.
124. See Michael Mullins, J., Iowa Ct. App., Sentencing Summary Chart, OFFICE OF THE
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (2007–2014), https://spd.iowa.gov/defense-resources/sentencing
-summary-chart. If the code year was available in an opinion, I used the corresponding
year’s chart. If the offense date was not clear, I relied on the 2012 chart.
125. For example, identity theft under Iowa Code section 715A.8(3) could be a Class D
felony or an aggravated misdemeanor depending on the amount fraudulently obtained. See
IOWA CODE § 715A.8(3) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/
715A.pdf. Both types of convictions would be entered under the same code section.
126. See Iowa Courts, Online Search (n.d.), https://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us (offering
online search function for appellate cases).
127. Specifically, for these cases, I used the Supreme Court number (e.g., 12-1234) to
look up the appellate docket for the appeal and then locate the district-court case number. I
then looked up the district court docket and navigated to “criminal charges/disposition.”
128. Cases that involve appeals of a deferred judgment are particularly difficult to
reconstruct from district-court records because, by statute, a deferred judgment drops off
the publicly accessible docket after the defendant’s term on probation is complete. See
IOWA CODE § 907.1(1) (2013) (describing the deferred judgment process); § 907.4 (2013)
(explaining the deferred judgment docket), both available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/
docs/code/2013/907.pdf.
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based my codin
ng on the in
nformation ccontained inn the State’s
appeellate brief.1229
B.
B Results
The study’ss results, as detailed in tthe followingg graphs andd
text, support my
m hypothesees: The apppellate defennders obtainn
moree favorable outcomes,
o
haave fewer prrocedural prooblems, seekk
furth
her review more
m
consisttently, and oobtain furtheer review byy
the Supreme Court
C
more often thann their couurt-appointedd
coun
nterparts. It is
i less clear who comess out on top between the
appeellate defend
ders and priv
vately retaineed counsel. A
As explainedd
below
w, appellate defenders outperform
o
rretained counnsel on some
meassures, and un
nderperform
m on others.
1. Ou
utcomes: Ap
ppellate Defeenders Obtaiin More Favvorable
Outccomes than Court
C
Appoin
nted Attorneeys, and Sligghtly Fewer
than Retained Co
ounsel.

05/10/2016 12:12:25

129. Appellate brieffs are public reco
ords in Iowa. IOW
WA R. APP. P. 6
6.110(5)(a) (20133)
(“Briefs filed with the clerk of the suprreme court shall nnot be confidentiial.”), available aat
https:///www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/C
CourtRulesChaptter/06-30-2014.6. pdf.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 36 Side B

The results concerning the first hyypothesis—thhat appellate
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cases th
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supp
ported by thee data, as demonstrated
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d in the grapph above. Inn
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the 2012–2013 sample, the
t
appellaate defendeers obtainedd
favorrable action in 19.38 percent of their cases.130 Inn
comp
parison, cou
urt-appointed
d attorneys w
won only 9.882 percent oof
theirr cases.131 Th
his puts the rate
r of obtaiining favorabble action byy
the appellate
a
deffender at ro
oughly twicee that of couurt-appointedd
attorrneys.132 Priv
vately retained counsel oobtained favoorable actionn
moree often than both groupss, obtaining at least a paartial victoryy
in 21
1.95 percent of cases.133
2. Deefective Filin
ngs: Appella
ate Defenderrs Have Few
wer Filings
Striccken and Aree Defaulted Far
F Less Oft
ften than Botth CourtAppo
ointed Attorn
neys and Rettained Counnsel.


05/10/2016 12:12:25

130. The appellate deefenders obtained
d favorable actionn in 100 out of 5116 appeals.
d attorneys obtain
ned favorable actiion in 33 out of 3336 appeals.
131. Court-appointed
he appellate defeenders obtained ffavorable outcom
mes 1.9735 timees
132. Technically, th
o
than court-aappointed attorney
ys.
more often
133. Retained counsel obtained favorrable action in 277 out of 123 appeeals. For purposees
of com
mparison, in the study
s
period the State obtained faavorable action inn 77.78 percent oof
State’ss appeals (or fou
urteen out of eig
ghteen). See Tabble 23: State/Atttorney General aas
Litigan
nt, infra p. 250. This is between
n four and five ttimes the mean rrate for favorablle
action in defendants’ ap
ppeals.
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As the precceding graph
h indicates, the data alsso show thaat
appeellate defend
ders have far fewer probllems with thheir pleadinggs
and briefs
b
beforee the appellaate courts, wh
which supportts the secondd
hypo
othesis. The appellate deefenders weere defaultedd in just 0.199
perceent of their cases—one
c
out of 516 aappeals. Couurt-appointedd
attorrneys did no
ot fare nearlly as well: A
At least onee default andd
penaalty was enttered in 22..62 percent of appeals..134 Retainedd
coun
nsel were defaulted
d
at roughly thhe same raate as courttappo
ointed attorneeys, in 21.95
5 percent of their cases.1135
The data allso favor th
he appellate defenders bbased on the
rate of strickeen pleading
gs. The apppellate deffenders saw
w
docu
uments strick
ken by the clerk or a ccourt order in only 0.588
perceent of their cases, or th
hree out of 5516 appeals.. In contrastt,
courtt-appointed attorneys’ filings
fi
were sstricken in nnearly a thirdd
of caases—29.76 percent of appeals,
a
or 1100 out of 336. Privatelyy
retain
ned counsel did slightly better, thouugh their filinngs were stilll
strick
ken far in excess of thee appellate ddefenders: 221.95 percennt
of caases handled
d by retained
d counsel—ttwenty-seveen out of 1233
appeeals—involved stricken documents.
d
3. Exxhausting thee Appellate Process:
P
App
ppellate Defeenders Seek
Further Review More
M
Often than Court-A
Appointed A
Attorneys
and Retained
R
Co
ounsel.
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134. Court-appointed
d attorneys were defaulted
d
in 76 o f 336 appeals.
d in 27 of 123 apppeals.
135. Retained counseel were defaulted
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The third hypothesis, that app ellate defennders betteer
exhaaust the appeellate process, was also ssupported byy the data, aas
can be
b seen in the
t precedin
ng graph.136 The appellaate defenderrs
filed
d application
ns for furtheer review inn 79.57 perccent of cases
they lost.137 For court-appoin
nted attorneeys, that num
mber was jusst
44.88 percent.1388 Retained counsel
c
fell iin between tthe appellate
defen
nders and co
ourt-appointed attorneyss; private law
wyers soughht
furth
her review in
n 56.25 perceent of their ccriminal appeals.139
4. Fu
urther Review: Retained
d Counsel Obbtain Furtheer Review off
Adveerse Decision
ns Slightly More
M
Often tthan Appellaate
Defeenders, Who Do Much Beetter than Apppointed Coounsel.
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136. In contrast to crriminal defendantts, the data show
w that the State is a highly selectivve
litigan
nt: The Attorney General
G
sought fu
urther review in oonly twenty of 160 losses, for a ratte
of 12.5
50 percent, comp
pared to the overrall rate of 63.933 percent for deffense counsel. Seee
Table 23: State/Attorneey General as Litiigant, infra p. 2500; Table 7: Furthher Review Soughht
Follow
wing Loss, infra p.
p 245.
137. The appellate defenders
d
filed ap
pplications for fuurther review in 331 of 416 casees
that weere affirmed in whole.
w
138. Court-appointed
d attorneys filed applications for further review iin 136 out of 3003
cases that
t were affirmed
d in whole.
139. Retained counsel filed applications for further reeview in 54 of 996 cases that werre
affirmeed in whole.
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The fourth hypothesis revealed perhaps the most striking
difference between types of counsel.140 As seen on the preceding
graph, the appellate defenders obtained further review by the
Supreme Court in eighteen cases during the sample period,
which works out to 4.33 percent of their cases that were
affirmed in whole.141 In stark contrast, court-appointed attorneys
obtained further review in zero cases, failing to garner Supreme
Court review with any of their 136 applications for further
review. Retained counsel just slightly outpaced the appellate
defenders, obtaining further review in five cases—5.21 percent
of the cases they lost.142
V. ANALYSIS

05/10/2016 12:12:25

140. As with the rate of favorable outcomes, the State’s rate of obtaining further review
differs significantly from that of criminal defendants: The State obtained further review in
seven of twenty applications during the study, for a rate of 35.00 percent. See Table 23:
State/Attorney General as Litigant, infra p. 250.
141. Presented differently, appellate defenders succeeded on 5.44 percent of their
applications for further review, securing review in 18 of 331 cases. See Table 9: Proportion
of Further-Review Applications Granted, infra p. 245.
142. Presented differently, retained counsel succeeded on 9.26 percent of their
applications for further review (five of fifty-four). See id.
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The analytic component of this piece includes both the
expected exploration of whether the data supported or refuted
my hypotheses, as well as some unexpected findings. The
empirical data ultimately support the notion that appellate
defenders provide better representation—at least on the metrics
explored in this study. The data also put the appellate defenders
roughly on par with privately retained counsel, suggesting that
even wealthy defendants cannot purchase an advantage much
beyond counsel provided at public expense by government
employees.
Moving away from the hypothesized results, the data also
support the unexpected finding that appellate defenders not only
win more, but win differently—they excel at obtaining
sentencing reductions, have charges acquitted with prejudice
slightly more often than court-appointed attorneys, and they
obtain new trials more often than court-appointed attorneys but
far less often than their privately retained counterparts. The final
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piece of analysis returns to the case-assignment discussion from
Part II.B.1.a and calls into question whether, as the chief
appellate defender reported, his office keeps more serious cases:
The overall data show that court-appointed attorneys and
appellate defenders handled cases of almost identical offense
severity during the period studied.
A. On All Four Objective Measures, Appellate Defenders
Provide Better Representation than Court-Appointed Attorneys.

05/10/2016 12:12:25

143. See Hoffman et al., supra note 91, at 225 (“What criminal defendants care most
about . . . is the actual outcome of the case.”).
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This study was designed to measure empirical data in four
areas in which the quality of counsel was thought to make a
difference: outcomes, procedures, exhausting the appellate
process, and obtaining further review. In all four areas, lawyers
from the Iowa Appellate Defender’s Office outperformed courtappointed attorneys for indigent defendants. As explained at
greater length below, the data on these measures suggest that the
appellate defenders have an institutional advantage and provide
better representation to their clients than most court-appointed
attorneys.
As to the first measure, the appellate defenders produced
nearly twice as many “wins” for their clients than courtappointed attorneys. For a criminal defendant, one might expect
that obtaining favorable action on appeal is the most important
metric for assessing whether counsel was effective.143 Criminal
defendants file notices of appeal hoping for a reduction in
sentence, to have their convictions set aside, or for a new trial—
and the data suggest the appellate defenders are better at
achieving these goals than appointed attorneys.
The second measure provides a more indirect rating of
counsel’s effectiveness, though the difference between types of
counsel on this measure suggests a profound difference in the
documents filed by public defenders (who specialize in appeals)
and court-appointed attorneys (who may or may not have
extensive appellate experience). The appellate defenders’ filings
were basically without problems—just one assistant appellate
defender was defaulted for missing a deadline, and only three
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144. Retained counsel were defaulted in 21.95 percent of cases (compared to 22.62
percent for court-appointed attorneys) and their pleadings were stricken in 21.95 percent of
cases (compared to 29.76 percent of cases for court-appointed attorneys).
145. Welch v. Lund, 616 F.3d 756, 759 (8th Cir. 2010).
146. See id. at 759–60.
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cases involved stricken filings. Even combining defaults and
stricken filings, the appellate defenders had procedural problems
in 0.78 percent of the cases they handled. Court-appointed
attorneys’ cases were plagued by problems: They were defaulted
in 22.62 percent of appeals and their filings were stricken in
29.76 percent of appeals. Do these data prove that better
filings—at least in the sense that they comply with appellate
rules, or come close enough to survive a motion to strike—lead
to better representation? Not causally. One would expect that, if
increased compensation led to better representation, retained
counsel would have the fewest number of procedural and
technical defects; instead, the appellate defenders far
outperformed retained counsel on this process metric and
retained counsel performed nearly as poorly as the courtappointed attorneys on the rate of defaults.144 All this being said,
the disparity between the appellate defenders’ filings, and the
concomitant higher rate of favorable outcomes compared to
court-appointed attorneys, suggests this is a distinction that may
make a difference.
Third, the appellate defenders sought further review in a
much greater proportion of their losses before the Court of
Appeals. This matters for purposes of seeking federal habeas
corpus relief, as “an Iowa prisoner whose appeal is deflected to
the Iowa Court of Appeals must file an application for further
review in the Supreme Court of Iowa to exhaust his claims
properly in the state courts.”145 Prisoners who do not exhaust
state appeals are procedurally barred and effectively locked out
of federal habeas.146 As a result of these legal rules, the appellate
defenders—by filing more applications for further review—
provide clients a second and third bite at the apple: once in front
of the Iowa Supreme Court and then another (if there are viable
federal constitutional issues) in the federal district courts.
Fourth, the appellate defenders were able to get cases to the
Supreme Court with some regularity, whereas court-appointed
attorneys failed to do so with any of their more than 100
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applications during the sample period.147 On eighteen occasions,
the appellate defenders brought issues to the Supreme Court on
further review from the Court of Appeals.148 This statistic
matters for both speculative and concrete reasons. If the other
measures are to be believed—and appellate defenders are better
advocates than court-appointed lawyers—this fourth metric,
concerning grants of further review, may be an indirect
barometer of how the Iowa Supreme Court perceives counsel’s
performance. A detailed report concerning the United States
Supreme Court argues that those Justices favor granting
certiorari to petitions filed by leading Supreme Court advocates
because the cases will be better argued, because good issues
have been identified,149 and—as a different commentator has
described it—because these appellate specialists “speak the
court’s language.”150 Given that the data here show appellatedefender applications are granted about four percent of the time,
and that number is zero for court-appointed attorneys, one might
speculate that a similar bias in selection toward “better”
lawyering is present at Iowa’s Supreme Court.
The concrete reason that success on further-review
applications matters for criminal defendants is that Iowa’s Court

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 40 Side A
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147. Pronounced differences between types of counsel are not unheard of. In the
Philadelphia study comparing public defenders and appointed counsel for murder
defendants, the public defenders had a striking record: None of their clients ever received
the death penalty, compared to two percent of all criminal defendants. See Anderson &
Heaton, supra note 102, at 182–83.
148. The appellate defenders’ rate of obtaining discretionary further review in criminal
appeals is in line with the data in other states. The appellate defenders obtained further
review 4.33 percent of the time (and retained counsel obtained further review 5.21 percent
of the time), compared to the overall rates of 4.1 percent in California, 5.6 percent in
Illinois, and 6.7 percent in Maryland. See REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 43 n.3.
149. See generally Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts and John Shiffman, The Echo Chamber:
At America’s Court of Last Resort, A Handful of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket,
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/ (Dec. 8, 2014) (indicating that
Justice Scalia will “in some instances . . . vote against hearing a case if he fears it will be
presented poorly and he expects another opportunity to rule on the issues the case
presents”). If Iowa’s Supreme Court justices engage in a similar analysis when a courtappointed further-review application presents an issue poorly, they may deny that
application and instead grant an appellate-defender application that they know will be
better argued.
150. See Dahlia Lithwick, Amicus: The Super Lawyers (Slate podcast, Jan. 10, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/amicus/2015/01/dahlia_lithwick_speaks_with_joan
_biskupic_about_supreme_court_bar_s_lack.html (Jan. 2015) (discussing Biskupic et al.,
supra note 149).
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of Appeals is bound by Supreme Court decisions.151 On any
issue for which the defendant has urged a change—or even an
expansion—of the law, the only viable opportunity to obtain a
victory is before the Supreme Court, and the data show that is an
opportunity unlikely to present itself when a defendant is
represented by court-appointed attorneys.152 Also, defendants
fare better before the Supreme Court than the Court of Appeals,
winning about half of granted further-review applications.153
This suggests that criminal defendants who cannot get in front of
the Supreme Court are missing out on a meaningful opportunity
for relief.
B. The Appellate Defenders and Privately Retained Counsel
Provide Comparable Representation, Given the Mixed Results
on the Objective Measures.
When compared to privately retained counsel, the data are a
mixed bag for the appellate defenders. Retained counsel
obtained favorable outcomes slightly more often.154 Appellate
defenders sought further review more often,155 but retained
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151. E.g., State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (“We are not at
liberty to overturn Iowa Supreme Court precedent.”). The Court of Appeals is also bound
by its own published opinions, which can only be overturned en banc or by the Supreme
Court. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.904(2)(c) (2013) (noting that unpublished opinions, in
contrast to published opinions, “shall not constitute controlling legal authority”), available
at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf.
152. One might wonder whether court-appointed attorneys’ low number of successful
further-reviews applications is mitigated by cases retained by the Supreme Court. During
2012–2013, the Supreme Court retained seventeen criminal appeals by defendants: seven
by appellate defenders (41.18 percent), six by court-appointed attorneys (35.29 percent),
and four by retained counsel (25.53 percent). See Table 24: Retained Cases (2012–2013),
infra p. 251. This is in line with the court-appointed attorneys’ overall representation rate
(34.46 percent) before the Court of Appeals. Compare id. with Table 19: Type of Counsel
Overall (Pro Se Excluded), infra p. 249.
153. Of the twenty-three further-review applications filed by defendants and granted in
2012 and 2013, 52.17 percent of defendants (twelve) obtained favorable action; 39.13
percent (nine) had their convictions affirmed outright; and two defendants died, mooting
two appeals (8.70 percent of cases granted further review). See Table 25: Outcomes of
Cases Granted Further Review (2012–2013), infra p. 251.
154. Retained counsel obtained favorable action in 21.9 percent of appeals, compared to
19.38 percent for the appellate defenders. See Table 1: Favorable Action, infra p. 242.
155. Appellate defenders sought further review in 79.57 percent of appeals, compared to
retained counsel’s seeking further review in 56.25 percent of appeals. See Table 7: Further
Review Sought Following Loss, infra p. 245.
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counsel had a higher proportion of granted applications.156
Appellate defenders’ favorable outcomes included a greater
proportion of charges acquitted with prejudice, while retained
counsel obtained new trials more often than sentencing
reductions.157 The only area in which the appellate defenders
significantly outpaced retained counsel was on procedural and
technical defects.158
It’s hard to declare a clear winner of this particular
comparison—other than the victory of the appellate defenders
on the technical niceties of appellate practice. Given the makeup
and economic motivation of each group, that disparity makes
some sense: Appellate defenders practice criminal-appellate law
full-time on a salary and are familiar with the ins and outs of
appellate procedure; it’s unlikely that any privately retained
attorneys can do the same, given the small number of criminal
appellants who can afford to pay.159 The other, more-mixed
results suggest that neither appellate defenders nor retained
counsel have a clear advantage. Wasserman, the author of the
New York criminal-appeals study, reasoned that the grant of a
new trial or sentencing correction was the type of outcome
“more dependent on skilled advocacy” than the “mechanical”
analysis related to obtaining a dismissal on speedy-trial
grounds;160 if he is right, the data still split the difference—
retained counsel obtain proportionally more new trials, while
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 41 Side A
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156. Retained counsel succeeded on 9.26 percent of applications, while appellate
defenders succeeded on 5.44 percent. See Table 9: Proportion of Further-Review
Applications Granted, infra p. 245. In the total percentage of losses in which further review
was granted, retained counsel still come out slightly ahead with 5.21 percent of their
appeals, compared to 4.33 percent for appellate defenders. See Table 8: Further Review
Obtained Following Loss, infra p. 245.
157. See Table 2: Acquitted, infra p. 242; Table 3: New Trial, infra p. 242; Table 4: ReSentenced, infra p. 243.
158. Just 0.19 percent of appellate-defender appeals involved a default, compared to
21.95 percent of retained-counsel appeals, and just 0.58 percent of appellate-defender
filings were stricken, compared to 21.95 percent of retained-counsel filings. See Table 5:
Defaults, infra p. 244; Table 6: Stricken Filings, infra p. 244.
159. Among privately retained counsel, the greatest number of appeals handled in 2012
and 2013 was seven appeals by Alfredo Parrish. It seems unlikely that 3.5 criminal appeals
per year could sustain any law practice, though some lawyers may also practice appellate
law in other areas. Because Iowa does not certify “specialists” for purposes of lawyer
advertising, it is difficult to gauge the prevalence (or scarcity) of full-time appellate
practitioners.
160. WASSERMAN, supra note 3, at 99.
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appellate defenders obtain more re-sentencings. One could
puzzle out whether a slight edge on any particular metric truly
makes appellate defenders or court-appointed lawyers better for
criminal defendants, but the easier—and perhaps more
accurate—conclusion is that the performance of the two groups
is comparable.
C. An Unexpected Result: Appellate Defenders Win Differently
and Outperform Court-Appointed Attorneys Most Significantly
on Sentencing Issues.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 41 Side B

The hypotheses for this study correctly anticipated that the
appellate defenders’ overall number of “wins” would
substantially outpace court-appointed attorneys, but drilling
down into the type of victory reveals still more differences
between the two groups. The divide between appellate defenders
and court-appointed attorneys is greatest on sentencing issues.
Appellate defenders obtained favorable action on a sentencing
issue in 9.49 percent of all their appeals, while for courtappointed attorneys that number was just 3.87 percent. The
appellate defenders’ performance on sentencing exceeded
retained counsel as well, with privately retained attorneys
obtaining a favorable sentencing outcome in 7.32 percent of
appeals.
The difference among type of counsel for other subtypes of
favorable action is more limited. For “acquitted” outcomes, in
which at least one conviction was eliminated with prejudice, all
three groups were fairly similar: 3.68 percent for the appellate
defenders, 2.38 percent for court-appointed attorneys, and 2.44
percent for privately retained counsel. For new trials, appellate
defenders outperformed court-appointed attorneys (6.20 percent
for the appellate defenders and 3.57 percent for court-appointed
attorneys), and private counsel outperformed both groups by a
wide margin, obtaining a new trial in 12.19 percent of their
appeals.
Wasserman suggested in his book that “[s]entence appeals
may depend on the attorneys’ skill in making an apparently
recalcitrant and dangerous offender appear sinned against as

05/10/2016 12:12:25
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well as sinning.”161 This would be consistent with the appellate
defenders, who specialize in criminal-appellate law,
outperforming more generalist court-appointed and privately
retained lawyers on sentencing issues. But Wasserman’s logic is
harder to follow in Iowa, which has an indeterminate sentencing
scheme and highly deferential sentencing review for sentences
within statutory limits.162 Although I have no empirical data to
prove it, I suspect that many more sentencing appeals
(particularly successful appeals that result in a re-sentencing)
turn on procedural problems, like failing to state reasons for a
sentence,163 failing to notify a defendant of his rights under the
rules of criminal procedure,164 or imposing an improper fine or
surcharge.165 In those cases, the appellate defenders likely have
an issue-spotting advantage, given the complexities of Iowa’s
sentencing code and the frequency with which certain issues
recur.
D. The Appellate Defenders and Court-Appointed Attorneys
Represented Similar Percentages of Felons and Misdemeanants
in 2012–2013.
As mentioned in Part II.B.1.a, the assignment of cases
between the AD’s Office and court-appointed attorneys is not
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161. Id. at 99.
162. See IOWA CODE § 902.3 (2013) (providing for indeterminate sentencing for all
felonies other than Class A felonies), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/
2013/902.pdf; IOWA CODE § 903.1(2) (2013) (providing that all aggravated misdemeanants
sentenced to a term of incarceration greater than one year shall serve indeterminate
sentences), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/903.pdf; State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (“[T]he decision of the district court to impose
a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its
favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of
inappropriate matters.”).
163. See, e.g., State v. Argueta-Rivas, No. 11-1135, 2012 WL 837260, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 4, 2012) (remanding for re-sentencing because the reasons for sentencing were
“not apparent”).
164. See, e.g., State v. McLachlan, No. 12-2040, 2013 WL 5498059, at *4 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 2, 2013) (remanding for re-sentencing because the district court did not grant a
defendant the right to allocution).
165. See, e.g., State v. Pike, No. 13-0051, 2013 WL 5951192, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov.
6, 2013) (remanding for re-sentencing to correct imposition of improper fine); State v.
Robinson, 841 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (remanding for re-sentencing to
correct imposition of unauthorized domestic-violence surcharge).
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166. The AD actually withdraws before filing a combined certificate, which means that
there are no transcripts to review at the point of screening because none have been prepared
yet. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.804 (2013) (describing form and use of combined certificate),
available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf;
see also, e.g., State v. Lange Online Docket, https://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/ESAWeb
App/AIndexFrm (application to withdraw on 06/01/2012, court-appointed attorneys
appointed on 06/11/2012 and 07/16/2012, combined certificate filed 07/26/2012).
167. Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note 28.
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purely random. This matters because it could potentially affect
my data—if the AD can screen out “loser” cases and keep
“winners,” this would skew the AD’s rate of favorable
outcomes. I tentatively rule out this confounding variable for
two reasons. First, even if we accept the premise that a screening
attorney can predict outcomes based on a cursory review of the
record, I am skeptical that can be done at the stage when
screening decisions are made: pre-briefing and before any
detailed review of the record.166 Without any transcripts or a
complete record, it seems virtually impossible for anyone to
“game the system” and determine which cases present a viable
issue with a likelihood of success versus which cases are likely
to be summarily affirmed. This militates against the likelihood
that the chief appellate defender has put his thumb on the scale
or used some sort of selection bias to skew his office’s numbers.
That said, the second reason I rule out selection bias is
because my data don’t reflect even the limited selection biases
described by the chief appellate defender. The chief appellate
defender told me that the non-random component focused on
offense severity—the AD only withdrew from Class A felonies
when it could not undertake representation due to a conflict,
they “try to keep the more serious cases,” and the office tries to
“generally withdraw from the less serious cases—driving
offenses, OWI, simple possession.”167 The data displayed in the
graph on the following page, looking at the whole population of
criminal appeals in the study, do not support this description of
the office’s practices.
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168. See Table 10: Offense
O
Severity: Felony Appeals, infra p. 246.
O
Severity: Class A Feloniess, infra p. 246.
169. See Table 11: Offense
Findings from Thhe
170. See Jennifer M.. Saubermann & Marea L. Beemaan, Summary of F
A
Defend
der Survey: Timinng Requirements ffor Filing Appealls
Spangenberg Group’s Appellate
pr. 2005), availa
able at http://ww
ww.americanbar.oorg/content/dam/aaba/migrated/legaal
3 (Ap
servicees/downloads/sclaaid/indigentdefen
nse/appdefsurveyy2005.authcheckddam.pdf (revealinng
caseload of 75 percent felonies and 25 percent misdem
meanors among suurveyed appellateedefend
der offices).
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The appellaate defenderrs and courtt-appointed attorneys, aas
grou
ups, handled
d almost ideentical propportions of felonies andd
misd
demeanors in
n the 2012–
–2013 periodd: 75.19 perccent felonies
for the
t
AD’s office
o
and 75.89 perceent for couurt-appointedd
attorrneys.168 Thiis is rather the oppositte of the chhief appellate
defen
nder’s description—co
ourt-appointted attorneeys handledd
marg
ginally moree serious casees, rather thaan less. In teerms of Class
A felonies, the data
d do not mirror
m
the chhief appellatte defender’s
descrription either: Thirty of
o the AD’’s cases (5.81 percentt)
involved Class A feloniees, compareed to thirtyy-six (10.71
perceent) of the court-appoint
c
ted attorneyss’ cases.169 IInterestinglyy,
this data for all criminal app
peals—rougghly seventy-five percennt
felon
nies, twenty
y-five percen
nt misdemeeanors—traccks preciselyy
with the breakdo
own of appeaals in fourteeen other stattes.170
Support forr the chief appellate
a
de fender’s desscription cann
be fo
ound by elim
minating posstconviction appeals andd consideringg
only direct app
peals. Lookiing at the numbers thhis way (aas
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displlayed in thee graph bellow), the A
AD represennts a greateer
proportion of felonies:
f
74
4.31 percentt for the A
AD’s officee,
comp
pared to 60
0.42 percen
nt for courtt-appointed attorneys.1771
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171. See Table 31: Offense
O
Severity: Felony Appeals ((Direct Appeals),, infra p. 254.
172. See id.
173. For a comparison that includes data for retainedd counsel, as welll as the appellatte
ders and court-aappointed attorneeys, see the cluustered and staccked bar chart aat
defend
Appen
ndix I, infra p. 255
5.
174. Compare Tablee 1: Favorable Acction, infra p. 2422, with Table 26: Favorable Actioon
(Direct Appeals), infra p. 252.
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The AD, when the samplee is limited to direct aappeals, alsoo
repreesents signiificantly more
m
Class A felons than courttappo
ointed attorrneys: 5.10 percent ((AD) to 22.60 percennt
(appointed).172
Any divergences based
d on the typee of appeal ((direct versuus
Statistics foor the directtpostcconviction) give me litttle pause. S
appeeal-only sam
mple generaally paint thhe same piccture as the
comb
bined directt-appeal and
d postconvicction samplee.173 In bothh
samp
ples, the AD
D obtains fav
vorable actioon at a greaater rate thann
courtt-appointed attorneys: 1.6144 tim
mes more liikely in the
direcct-appeal-only sample, versus
v
1.97335 times moore likely inn
the combined
c
saample.174 Allso in both ssamples, thee AD has faar
feweer proceduraal defects th
han court-apppointed attoorneys: Bothh
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the level of defaults175 and the level of stricken filings176 are
relatively consistent. So too for the very similar rates at which
further review was sought177 and granted.178 In short, whether
you limit the study to direct appeals or consider both direct
appeals and postconviction appeals, the findings outlined above
hold up: The appellate defenders generally perform better than
court-appointed attorneys.179
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Numbers and graphs never tell the whole story. Every
study, no matter how empirical or objective its source data, has
limitations. As described below, the study here is limited—most
notably in terms of time-period, jurisdiction, and potential
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175. On direct appeal, the AD was defaulted in 0.21 percent of appeals, compared to
0.19 percent in the combined sample. Compare Table 27: Defaults (Direct Appeals), infra
p. 252, with Table 5: Defaults, infra p. 244. Court-appointed attorneys were defaulted
21.88 percent of the time in the direct-appeal sample and 22.62 percent in the combined
sample. See id.
176. On direct appeal, AD filings were stricken in 0.64 percent of appeals, compared to
0.58 percent of appeals in the combined sample. Compare Table 28: Stricken Filings
(Direct Appeals), infra p. 252, with Table 6: Stricken Filings, infra p. 244. Court-appointed
attorneys’ filings were stricken 31.77 percent of the time on direct appeal, compared to
29.75 percent of the time in the combined sample. See id.
177. The AD sought further review 79.03 percent of the time on direct appeal, and 79.57
percent of the time in the combined sample. Compare Table 29: Further Review Sought
Following Loss (Direct Appeals), infra p. 253, with Table 7: Further Review Sought
Following Loss, infra p. 245. Court-appointed attorneys sought further review in 38.92
percent of direct appeals, compared to 44.88 percent in the combined sample. See id.
178. The AD’s further-review applications were granted 4.84 percent of the time on
direct appeal, compared to 4.33 percent of the time in the combined sample. Compare
Table 30: Further Review Obtained Following Loss (Direct Appeals), infra p. 253, with
Table 8: Further Review Obtained Following Loss, infra p. 245. Court-appointed attorneys
did not obtain further review in either sample. See id.
179. Some research, presented as an aside in the NCSC study of five state appellate
courts, indicates that “winning big” occurs more frequently in appeals of the least severe
offenses, while the most severe offenses result in “winning little.” REVERSIBLE ERROR,
supra note 4, at 6 (indicating, however, that the relationships between sentence length and
outcome on appeal are statistically weak). If the appellate defender successfully screened
out low-severity cases and kept high-severity cases, one would then expect the appellate
defender to have more “little” wins and court-appointed attorneys to have more “big” wins.
The study reveals that, in Iowa, appellate defenders have far more “little” wins (around
three times as many re-sentencing outcomes) and somewhat more “big” wins (between 1.5
and twice as many acquittals and new trials) than do court-appointed attorneys. See Table
2: Acquitted, infra p. 242; Table 3: New Trial, infra p. 242; Table 4: Re-Sentenced, infra p.
243.
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confounding variables. With those limitations in mind, the data
are still compelling and the suggestion that some indigent
defendants get better lawyers than others should worry observers
of the criminal justice system. So what can be done about it? I
make two proposals below: expanding the AD’s office and
reforming certain aspects of the court-appointed-attorney
system. I conclude by addressing the lingering question of
whether the data showing comparatively weak performance by
court-appointed attorneys amounts to ineffective assistance.
A. Limitations on the Study.
Before looking at the data for its relevance to public policy
and understanding the criminal justice system, it is important to
acknowledge the limitations of this study and the data it
contains.
First, the study in this article captures a narrow snapshot in
time: calendar years 2012 and 2013. It would be a mistake to
assume that the data collected here necessarily mirror the
numbers for other years. Courts change, as do criminal statutes,
constitutional issues, and the particular attorneys involved. One
area that jumps out as a potential source of variance is change in
an appellate court: Over the course of 2012–2013, one judge
retired180 and the Court of Appeals saw three different chief
judges discharge the duties of that office.181 There is little doubt
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 44 Side B
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180. When Chief Judge Larry Eisenhauer retired in 2013, Iowa’s governor appointed
Judge Christopher M. McDonald to the Court of Appeals. See Office of the Governor of
Iowa, News Release: Branstad Appoints Christopher L. McDonald to the Iowa Court of
Appeals, Sept. 19, 2013, available at https://governor.iowa.gov/2013/09/branstad-appointschristopher-l-mcdonald-to-the-iowa-court-of-appeals/.
181. Following Chief Judge Rosemary Sackett’s retirement, the Court of Appeals
elected Judge Larry Eisenhauer as chief judge. See Iowa Judicial Branch, News Release:
Iowa Court of Appeals Elects Eisenhauer as Chief Judge, Feb. 10, 2012, available at http:
//www.iowacourts.gov/For_the_Media/news_releases/NewsItem508/index.asp. Following
Chief Judge Eisenhauer’s retirement in 2013, Judge David Danilson was elected chief
judge. See Iowa Judicial Branch, News Release: Iowa Court of Appeals Elects Danilson as
Chief Judge, Dec. 12, 2013, available at http://www.iowacourts.gov/For_the_Media/news_
releases/NewsItem15/index.asp (Dec. 12, 2013). During the period between the retirements
and election of a new chief judge, Judge Gayle Nelson Vogel served as acting chief judge.
Cf. IOWA CT. R. 21.1 (providing procedures for selecting acting chief justice in the absence
of the chief justice of the Iowa supreme court), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/
docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/10-29-2015.21.pdf.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 45 Side A

05/10/2016 12:12:25

BULLERRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND APPOINTED COUNSEL ON APPEAL

5/5/2016 1:02 PM

227

that different judges come to different decisions, and this change
in membership may have impacted the data.
Second, it is possible that a variable not tracked by this
study bears more strongly on appellate outcomes than the type
of appellate lawyer. For example, the issues raised—regardless
of whether they are raised by the appellate defenders or courtappointed attorneys—might drive outcomes. But this study did
not track the issues raised on appeal, largely because briefs182
that pre-date e-filing are difficult for the public to access
(limiting the ability to replicate this study) and because
qualitatively assessing the issues raised is more subjective than
quantitatively assessing the type of counsel assigned to an
appeal. Put simply, tracking issues would have required the kind
of subjectivity that I strove to avoid when compiling the data for
this piece. In addition to the issues raised on appeal, other
potential variables affecting outcomes might have been the
composition of Court of Appeals panels,183 whether error was
preserved by trial counsel,184 or whether the case involved a
guilty plea or trial.185 The aim of my study was not to conduct a
regression to reject hypotheses of potential variables behind
appellate outcomes—instead, I aimed to paint a picture of the
differences between types of counsel in criminal appeals. I hope
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182. Opinions alone are not sufficient to track raised issues because some cases are
affirmed without opinion or by memorandum opinion. See IOWA CT. R. 21.26, available at
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/10-29-2015.21.pdf; IOWA R.
APP. P. 6.1203 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRules
Chapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf.
183. There appears to be high variability among judges. Although my dataset tracked
only the opinion author—and not the participating judges—in each opinion, the rates of
granting a defendant favorable action on appeal ranged from a high of 22.22 percent (Judge
Vaitheswaran) to a low of 7.84 percent (Judge Vogel).
184. Iowa, unlike states that recognize “plain error,” has a longstanding tradition of
strictly enforcing the rules of error preservation. See State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324,
325 (Iowa 1999) (“We do not subscribe to the plain error rule in Iowa, have been persistent
and resolute in rejecting it, and are not at all inclined to yield on the point.”); Danforth,
Davis & Co. v. Carter, 1 Iowa 546, 552–53 (1855) (clearly stating the requirement of
“specifically stated” objections to preserve error, and noting that the error-preservation
rules are “eminently just and reasonable”).
185. In Iowa, a guilty plea waives all challenges to a conviction that are not intrinsic to
the plea—so only claims that bear on the decision to plead, like whether the plea is
knowing and voluntary, remain viable. See, e.g., State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395, 398
(Iowa 2000); State v. Culbert, 188 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Iowa 1971).

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 45 Side B

05/10/2016 12:12:25

BULLERRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

228

5/5/2016 1:02 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

to have done that and I would remind readers not to take this
study for more than it is.
Third, the data gathered here may not necessarily be ripe
for extrapolation to other jurisdictions. The method of assigning
cases between appellate defenders and court-appointed attorneys
is not entirely clear in Iowa—I concede that assignment is not
purely random, but it’s hard to reconcile the chief appellate
defender’s explanation with the data.186 Other states have their
own methodology for assigning cases and the traits of appellate
defenders and court-appointed attorneys may also differ
significantly from the picture painted in Part IV.B. These
differences would likely affect the four metrics used to rate
effectiveness if the study was transplanted to another
jurisdiction.
Keeping in mind the limitations discussed above, the
narrative that emerges from the data collected in this study is
still fairly straightforward: Appellate defenders, on most
measures, perform better than court-appointed attorneys and
roughly as well as privately retained counsel. But what does this
mean for Iowa’s legal community and the development of public
policy?
B. Policymakers Should Expand
the Iowa Appellate Defender’s Office.

05/10/2016 12:12:25

186. See supra Part V.D.
187. See, e.g., Dru Stevenson, Monopsony Problems with Court-Appointed Counsel, 99
IOWA L. REV. 2273, 2293 (2014) (noting that a public-defender system “has efficiency
advantages in terms of economies of scale” and that public defenders “tend to have more
public-service motivation and higher levels of relevant skills, compared to their
counterparts on lists of court-appointed independent contractors”); Texas Fair Defense
Project, Benefits of a Public Defender Office 1 (Sept. 2009) (arguing that a public-defender
office will provide better representation, and do it more cost-effectively, than the existing
court-appointment system), available at http://www.texasfairdefenseproject.org/pdf/harris
_county_pd_white_paper.pdf; Ronald W. Schneider, Jr., Comment, A Measure of Our
Justice System: A Look at Maine’s Indigent Criminal Defense Delivery System, 48 ME. L.
REV. 335, 396–98 (1996) (asserting that a public-defender system would provide better
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The most straightforward take-away from these data is that
it makes sense to hire more appellate defenders and increase the
proportion of defendants represented by the AD’s Office rather
than court-appointed attorneys. I would not be the first writer to
suggest expanding public-defender offices.187 Notably, the State
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Public Defender’s data show that, at least for combined trialand appellate-level costs, public defenders are significantly
cheaper on a per-case basis.188 If my data show that appellate
defenders achieve better outcomes, and the State Public
Defender’s data show that they do so more cost-effectively, it is
difficult to imagine a sound rebuttal to expanding the appellate
defender’s staff.189
C. Reforming the Existing Court-Appointed Attorney System.
Even if Iowa does not expand the ranks of its appellate
defenders, the State Public Defender can take action to ensure
that contract attorneys more closely approximate appellate
defenders—at least in terms of training and experience. The
SPD promulgated new rules (effective January 1, 2015) that
impose minimum qualifications on future court-appointed
attorneys.190 To represent a criminal defendant on direct appeal
or a postconviction appeal, the new rules require participation in
a “basic criminal appeals training” put on by the SPD Office,
unless the attorney has already handled a criminal appeal,191 as
well as three hours of CLE courses related to criminal law each
year in which the attorney handles criminal appeals.192 While
these rules might be a good start, the data here suggest they are
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representation than the existing court-appointment system). While not the first writer to
make this suggestion, I may well be the first prosecutor to do so.
188. See Office of the State Public Defender, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Presentation 3–4
(comparing case-costs, highlighting “savings” from expanding the number of public
defenders, and including a table displaying relevant data captioned “Savings to Indigent
Defense Fund from FY11 Expansion”), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/
publications/SD/2014/24872/24872.pdf.
189. Even following a massive expansion of the appellate defender corps, courtappointed attorneys would likely still be desirable for conflicts cases. However, at least in
theory, a secondary conflicts office could be established, and 100 percent of Iowa’s
criminal defendants could be represented by appellate defenders from either the home
office or the conflicts office. This is part of the rationale for the State Public Defender’s
Special Defense Unit, which handles certain conflicts cases statewide, as well as
representing indigents facing civil commitment as sexually violent predators.
190. See generally IOWA ADMIN. CODE R.493-11.3 (Jan. 7, 2015), available at https://
www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/01-07-2015.493.pdf.
191. IOWA ADMIN. CODE. R. 493-11.3(2)(a), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/
docs/iac/agency/01-07-2015.493.pdf.
192. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-11.3(2)(b), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/
docs/iac/agency/01-07-2015.493.pdf.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 46 Side B

05/10/2016 12:12:25

BULLERRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

230

5/5/2016 1:02 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

05/10/2016 12:12:25

193. Specifically, court-appointed attorneys were defaulted in 22.62 percent of cases and
at least one of their filings was stricken in 29.76 percent of cases.
194. Rachel Brooks, Job Satisfaction Among Court-Appointed Attorneys 45–46 (Aug.
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://digital.library.txstate.edu/bitstream/
handle/10877/4803/RBrooks%20Thesis%20may%2024%202012.pdf?sequence=1 (looking
at court-appointed attorneys in a Texas county).
195. See Office of the State Public Defender, SPD-Indigent Defense Discussion Forum,
available at https://spd.iowa.gov/defense-resources/spd-indigent-defense-discussion-forum
(describing the forum as “a meeting place that provides indigent defense attorneys
discussion forums, member profiles, file storage and more”).
196. Jennifer Zwagerman, Needed: A Mentor Program for Young Lawyers, IOWA
LAWYER 8 (Dec. 2014) (noting a need for a mentoring program, particularly now, when
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not enough. To start with, exempting attorneys who have
previously completed only one criminal appeal will do little to
remedy the repeated and persistent failure of court-appointed
attorneys to comply with the rules of appellate procedure in
filings before the appellate courts. All of the attorneys included
in this study would be exempt from the 2015 administrative rule,
yet court-appointed attorneys materially and substantially failed
to comply with the rules of appellate procedure in about one
quarter of cases193—often repeatedly and in spite of monetary
fines issued by the Supreme Court. These attorneys require
remedial training, if not ongoing monitoring by experienced
appellate defense counsel.
Developing and providing a support network for courtappointed attorneys might also improve effectiveness. Public
defenders, including the appellate defenders, work in multiattorney offices with colleagues they can collaborate with,
bounce ideas off of, and obtain assistance from during briefing
and preparation for oral arguments. In contrast, at least one
study has found that the vast majority of court-appointed
attorneys are solo practitioners, and even those in a group
practice work in relatively small firms of less than five
lawyers.194 Building on existing infrastructure, like web
forums,195 can help mitigate some of this difference in office
environments. So can developing additional support tools, like a
brief bank or an appellate-defense-specific practice guide. But
providing true support for a solo-practice contract attorney will
be difficult. Court-appointed attorneys are spread across Iowa’s
ninety-nine counties and the lack of mentoring relationships,
especially in rural counties, has been noted by the Iowa Bar.196
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Iowa should pay attention to the approach taken by some
other states, where institutional defenders review and provide
input to the work product of court-appointed lawyers. For
example, California’s system provides a network of staff
defenders who provide support to court-appointed attorneys,
including consultation, pre-filing review of briefs, and routine
evaluations of appointed-counsel work product.197 Adopting a
similar approach in Iowa would allow the expertise of the
appellate defenders to inform the work of court-appointed
attorneys and provide a mechanism for routinely monitoring and
evaluating brief quality without eliminating court-appointed
attorneys altogether.
Given the comparatively poor performance by courtappointed attorneys as compared to both the appellate defenders
and privately retained lawyers, some might suggest increasing
pay for court-appointed attorneys. The data make me somewhat
skeptical that this would improve the quality of representation.
Retained counsel, at least in theory, are paid at a market rate that
likely exceeds the government salaries of the appellate
defenders.198 Yet retained counsel’s performance on the
measures explored in this study were mixed: They only
marginally outperformed the appellate defenders in outcomes
and obtaining further review, and the appellate defenders
outperformed retained counsel on procedural defects and
seeking further review. One expects that, if increased pay
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 47 Side A
05/10/2016 12:12:25

fewer young attorneys set foot in the physical courthouse due to e-filing), available at
http://digital.turn-page.com/i/426134.
197. See, e.g., APPELLATE DEFENDERS, INC., CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE
PRACTICE MANUAL, 5–7, 45–57 (2014) (addressing, respectively, “assisted cases” and
“classification and matching of cases and attorneys”), available at http://www.adi-sandiego
.com/panel/manual/California_Appellate_Practice_Manual.pdf.
198. The mean salary among appellate defenders in 2012 was $93,834.00. See Iowa
Legislature, State Employee Salary Book, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/publications/fiscal/
salaryBook (search “2015” and “Inspections and Appeals, Dept of” in drop-down menus
on main page, then search “appellate defender” in chart to see salary range). According to a
2011 survey, 50.2 percent of Iowa lawyers had income exceeding $100,001.00 in 2010,
and another 10.6 percent of Iowa lawyers earned between $80,001.00 and $100,000.00.
IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, 2011 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LEGAL PRACTICE IN IOWA
10, available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iowabar.org/resource/resmgr/Files/2011_
Economic_Survey.pdf. This means that more than a slight majority of Iowa lawyers earns
more than the average appellate defender, and that 30.8 percent of Iowa lawyers make
more than $150,000, substantially outpacing even the chief appellate defender’s salary of
around $131,000.00.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 47 Side B

05/10/2016 12:12:25

BULLERRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

232

5/5/2016 1:02 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

directly correlated with increased performance, retained counsel
would outperform government-salaried appellate defenders on
relevant measures—yet the data do not support that conclusion.
Increasing compensation, at least without making other changes,
is not a change naturally suggested by the data in this study.199
Another area for potential reform that I ruled out was the
possibility of caps or restrictions on assigning appointed counsel
additional criminal cases.200 A 2014 investigation by the Iowa
Auditor of State found that eleven court-appointed attorneys had
billed more than twelve hours per day on multiple occasions.201
The particulars of the investigation are damning: On more than
fifty days, court-appointed attorneys claimed to work more than
twenty-four hours; on another ninety days, they claimed to work
more than twenty hours; and on another 390 days, more than
fifteen hours.202 However, the potential impact of imposing a
cap is not strongly supported by the appellate-outcome data
here. Only two court-appointed attorneys had more than ten
cases in the 2012–2013 sample, and even ten cases for a twoyear period falls far short of the seventy or eighty cases that the
chief appellate defender estimated each full-time appellate
defender would handle during the same period.
D. Disparity in Outcomes as Ineffective Assistance?

05/10/2016 12:12:25

199. Other data also support the notion that changes in compensation—or at least
compensation structures—do not materially affect the time spent on criminal trials or
appeals. See Richard E. Priehs, Appointed Counsel for Indigent Criminal Appellants: Does
Compensation Influence Effort? 21 JUST. SYS. J. 57, 67 (1999).
200. A student comment champions the approach taken by Washington’s Supreme Court
that requires indigent counsel to comply with caseload limitations. See generally Andrea
Woods, Comment, The Undersigned Attorney Hereby Certifies: Ensuring Reasonable
Caseloads for Washington Defenders and Clients, 87 WASH. L. REV. 217 (2014).
201. Office of Auditor of State, State of Iowa, News Release, Sept. 4, 2014, at 1,
available at http://auditor.iowa.gov/reports/1160-4270-0E01.pdf.
202. Id. at 1–2. The report does not identify whether any of the claims were for appellate
work and the specifics of those prosecutions are not yet matters of public record.
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As a prosecutor, I would be remiss if I failed to address the
legal-issue elephant in the room, given my data that show
defendants represented by appellate defenders do better on
appeal. Can a criminal defendant who was represented by courtappointed attorneys, and whose conviction is affirmed on
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appeal, claim ineffective assistance because he was not
appointed a “better” lawyer in the form of an appellate
defender? I think not. For one thing, it’s virtually impossible to
prove that a particular court-appointed attorney was less
effective than a hypothetical appellate defender, even if the data
show that—over time and on average—the appellate defenders
achieve better outcomes. For another, appellate claims of
ineffective assistance require proof of a reasonable probability
of a different outcome.203 Putting a number on that term—
“reasonable probability”—is hard. The courts have said that it
means something less than fifty percent,204 and I would argue
that it probably also means something more than the 9.56
percent overall difference in rates of favorable outcome.205
Lastly, appellate counsel’s decisions about which issues to raise
are virtually immune to second-guessing, given the tactical
nature of those decisions.206 No one disputes that an ideal
indigent-defense system would afford the same outcomes to
defendants regardless of the type of lawyer they receive. But, at
best, the data reported here suggest the desirability of some
institutional changes—changes in training for court-appointed
attorneys or in the availability of appellate defenders. This study
does not create an escape-hatch for convicted criminals who
happened to receive counsel from the court-appointed list.
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203. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 471–72 (2000) (explaining that
“[b]ecause the defendant in such cases must show that counsel’s deficient performance
actually deprived him of an appeal, . . . he must demonstrate that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he
would have timely appealed,” and that “[t]he question whether a defendant has made the
requisite showing will turn on the facts of the particular case”).
204. E.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (“[W]e believe that a
defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the
outcome in the case.”).
205. The 9.56 percent difference is calculated based on 19.38 percent favorable
outcomes for appellate defenders versus 9.82 percent for court-appointed attorneys. See
Table 1: Favorable Action, infra p. 242. The difference is even smaller when courtappointed attorneys’ performance is compared to the average for all 2012–2013 appeals
(excluding pro se appeals): The mean rate of favorable action was 16.41 percent, which
amounts to a 6.59 percent difference. See id.
206. See Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Iowa 1998) (“Selecting assignments to
assert as grounds for reversal is a professional judgment call [Iowa courts] are reluctant to
second-guess.”); Cuevas v. State, 415 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Iowa 1987) (noting “[h]ighly
competent appellate lawyers generally assign only the strongest points and rely on them for
reversal”).
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VII. CONCLUSION
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207. “There is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745, 751 (1983); see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) (noting that “review by an
appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of
which the accused is convicted, was not at common law, and is not now, a necessary
element of due process of law”). A cynic familiar with Jones and McKane might propose
asking the Iowa General Assembly to resolve any perceived disparities in attorneys’
effectiveness by abolishing statutory criminal appeals altogether. Not only would this
affect my job security as an appellate prosecutor, at least one scholar has considered
whether the modern Supreme Court would support abolishing the right to appeal. See
generally Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39
UCLA L. REV. 503, 504 (1992). In any event, the abolition of statutory criminal appeals in
Iowa seems highly unlikely in the near future.
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If we are to continue having criminal appeals in Iowa,207
then the effectiveness of counsel should not vary based on the
type of lawyer. The study contained in this article—even with its
limitations—suggests that some indigent defendants get better
lawyers than others, in the form of appellate defenders versus
court-appointed attorneys. This is an untenable state of affairs.
The exact mechanism for leveling the playing field between
indigent-defense counsel is beyond the scope of this article. The
data here note a problem, and the numbers alone cannot provide
a solution. But at least this much is clear: If Iowa’s criminal
justice system continues to have separate and distinct types of
appellate counsel for indigent defendants, something has to give.
The easiest solution is to hire more appellate defenders,
thereby shifting a greater proportion of representation to that
office. If this is not feasible for political or institutional reasons,
significant reforms—like giving the appellate defenders
oversight of court-appointed-attorney work product—are
needed. The bottom line is that court-appointed attorneys must
get better at their job and perform better on the metrics used in
this study. They must improve their advocacy to win a morecomparable numbers of cases, they must file papers with fewer
technical and procedural problems, they must seek further
review more often, and they must present more compelling cases
in further-review applications to obtain Supreme Court review.
The data here are not perfect, and of course I did not set out
to mathematically evaluate every potential variable in criminal
appeals. My goal here was to show, with some evidentiary
support, the difference between types of appellate defense
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counsel, and the different outcomes seen by their clients. The
story told by the data is that appellate defenders outperform
court-appointed attorneys on the metrics that matter. It’s time for
Iowa policymakers to do something about that.
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APPENDIX A: CODING RUBRIC
Docket Number
The docket number for each case was initially recorded from
the Iowa Judicial Branch website for each opinion day, then
compared with the online docket records available through Iowa
Courts Online. Where there was inconsistency between the
published opinion and the docket, the docket controls.208
Criminal Appeal/Postconviction Relief
The type of case was recorded based on the caption of the
case. Cases captioned State v. Defendant were coded as criminal
cases. Cases captioned Defendant v. State were coded as
postconviction cases. Coding did not vary based on the presence
of a cross-appeal, application for discretionary review, or
petition for writ of certiorari; those cases were coded for the
type of case in which they originated.209
County

05/10/2016 12:12:25

208. Compare State v. Sean Dana Scott, slip op. at 1, http://www.iowacourts.gov/about
_the_courts/court_of_appeals/court_of_appeals_opinions/recent_opinions/20130515/3-373
.pdf (listing Sup. Ct. No. 12-1531) with Iowa Courts Online, State v. Sean Dana Scott, Sup.
Ct. No. 12-1561, available at https://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/ESAWebApp/AppelSimp
Frame.
209. For example, State v. VanderLinden originated as a petition for writ of certiorari.
The defendant filed the writ to challenge a district court judge’s change of mind on a
motion for judgment of acquittal, setting aside of a verdict, and then reinstatement of the
verdict. See State v. VanderLinden, 2013 WL 1453245 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013). The Supreme
Court treated the writ as an application for discretionary review and transferred it to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Id. at *3. The case was coded as a criminal case.
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The county was recorded based on the cover page of the
slip opinion posted on the Judicial Branch website.
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Counsel Type
Type of counsel was determined by reviewing both the slip
opinions and the online docket for each case. In judicial
opinions, both court-appointed and retained counsel are
identified by their firm and/or city of residence. Employees of
the appellate defender’s office are identified as such. Attorneys
were coded as court-appointed if the docket shows that fees
were waived due to indigency, if the district court entered an
order appointing counsel, or if the clerk’s office labeled filings
as “Ct App.” Cases were coded for retained counsel if the docket
noted an appeal fee was paid. In the event of conflicting
evidence as to the type of counsel, the latest evidence
concerning counsel of record listed on the judicial opinion was
used as the basis for coding. If no defense attorney appeared on
behalf of the defendant at the time of the judicial opinion, the
case was coded as “pro se.”
AAG
The Assistant Attorney General whose name appeared on
the brief in each case was coded as the AAG for that case. In the
event one State attorney withdrew and was replaced by another,
only the latest attorney was coded.

The judge was coded based on who was listed as the author
of the court’s opinion.
Favorable/Unfavorable Outcome

05/10/2016 12:12:25

Unfavorable outcomes were coded to include all cases in
which the judgment was either affirmed in whole (or
conditionally affirmed) or the appeal was dismissed. All other
outcomes were classified as favorable.
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Type of Favorable Outcome
Types of outcomes were broken into three categories, coded
as follows—
1. Acquitted
Outcomes were coded as “acquitted” if one or more of the
counts charged were vacated with jeopardy attached
(meaning that the defendant cannot be retried on those
particular charges). This includes any case in which the
court ordered dismissal of some or all of a trial information
or remanded for an order of dismissal. Also included are
any cases in which a greater charge was vacated for
judgment to be entered on a lesser charge.

2. New trial
Outcomes were coded as “new trial” any time the Court of
Appeals ordered a new trial or “reversed and remanded”
without specifying that a count was dismissed or that the
district court should enter an acquittal. This included any
case in which a guilty plea was found to lack a factual basis
and cases in which an order of suppression was reversed
and the Court of Appeals did not affirm based on harmless
error.

Outcomes were coded as “re-sentenced” anytime the Court
of Appeals remanded for a new sentencing hearing or
modified a sentence. Any cases in which restitution or costs
were remanded, re-calculated, or modified were also coded
as “re-sentenced.”

Procedural Defect/No Procedural Defect
Cases were coded as having a procedural defect when they
had any stricken filings, any defaults issued by the clerk’s office
or a single-justice order, or both.
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1. Stricken filings
a. Cases were coded as having stricken filings if the
comments for any single-justice order or deputy-clerk order
listed defense filings as “struck” or “stricken,” or if orders
compelled the filing of amended documents. Cases were
also coded for having stricken filings if the deputy clerk
issued a letter that compelled defense counsel to file
amended documents or additional documents, such as a
supplemental appendix.
b. If filings made by other defense attorneys were stricken
prior to the appearance of counsel of record (whose name
appeared on the brief), the stricken filings were not
counted. If pro se defendants’ filings were stricken, they
were not attributed to counsel, but were attributed to pro se
defendants in cases in which no defense attorney appeared
as counsel of record.

2. Defaults
A case was coded as having a default if one was reflected
in the online docketing system. If defaults were formally
withdrawn by an order of a Supreme Court justice or a
letter issued by the deputy clerk, they were not coded.

Oral Argument

Further Review
1. Whether defense counsel filed an application.

05/10/2016 12:12:25

In cases with an unfavorable outcome, each case was also
coded for whether the defendant’s attorney filed an
application for further review, as reflected in entries on the
online docket. If a pro se defendant filed a further review,
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Cases were coded for oral argument based on whether
argument was actually held, as reflected on the online docket.
Cases originally scheduled for argument but then removed from
the oral-argument calendar were coded as not having oral
argument.
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the case was coded as defense counsel did not file. If
counsel filed an untimely application, the case was coded
as counsel did not file an application.

2. Whether the application was granted.
Each case that yielded an unfavorable outcome and in
which an application was filed was coded based on whether
the application was granted.
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APPENDIX B: DOCKET ABBREVIATIONS
Parties
T—Appellant
E/EE—Appellee
AD—Appellate Defender
AG—Attorney General
District Court Filings
DCT—District Court
PSI—Pre-Sentence Investigation Report
Briefs and Appellate Filings

Appellate Comments

05/10/2016 12:12:25

NFE—No Further Extensions
EDMS—Electronic Data Management System (e-filing)
CERT—Certified or Certificate
INFO—Informational (e.g., copy of notice of appeal)
CONF—Confidential
CT APP—Court-Appointed
SUPP—Supplemental (e.g., appendix or brief)
AM—Amended
CA—Court of Appeals
SC—Supreme Court

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 52 Side A

APPL—Application
EXT—Extension
CC—Combined Certificate
PB—Proof Brief
DP—Designation of Parts
FB—Final Brief
RB—Reply Brief
FRB—Final Reply Brief
X—Appendix
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APPENDIX C: OUTCOMES
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)

Table 1: Favorable Action
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases with
favorable action
100
33

Total
cases
516
336

Percentage with
favorable action
19.38%
09.82%

27
160

123
975

21.95%
16.41%

Number of cases with
acquittal
19
8

Total
cases
516
336

Percentage with
acquittal
03.68%
02.38%

3
30

123
975

02.44%
03.08%

Number of cases with
new trial
32
12

Total
cases
516
336

Percentage with new
trial
06.20%
03.57%

15
59

123
975

12.20%
06.05%

Table 2: Acquitted
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)
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Table 4: Re-Sentenced
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases with
re-sentencing
49
13

Total
cases
516
336

Percentage with resentencing
09.50%
03.87%

9
71

123
975

07.32%
07.28%
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APPENDIX D: PROCEDURAL DEFECTS
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)

Table 5: Defaults
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases
with defaults
1
76

Total cases
516
336

Percentage with
defaults
00.19%
22.62%

27
104

123
975

21.95%
10.67%

Table 6: Stricken Filings
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases with
stricken filings
3
100

Total
cases
516
336

Percentage with
stricken filings
00.58%
29.76%

27
130

123
975

21.95%
13.33%
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APPENDIX E: FURTHER REVIEWS
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)
210

Table 7: Further Review Sought Following Loss
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases
further review
sought
331
136

Number of
cases lost

Percentage further
review sought

416
303

79.57%
44.88%

54
521

96
815

56.25%
63.93%

211

Table 8: Further Review Obtained Following Loss
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases
further review
obtained
18
0

Number of
cases lost
416
303

Percentage further
review obtained (of all
cases)
4.33%
0.00%

5
23

96
815

5.21%
2.82%

Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases
further review
obtained
18
0

Number of
applications

Percentage applications
granted

331
136

05.44%
00.00%

5
23

54
521

09.26%
04.41%

05/10/2016 12:12:25

210. This table tracks only further-review applications following a complete loss (total
affirmance) at the Court of Appeals.
211. This table tracks the rate at which further-review applications were granted out of
all losses for each type of counsel, rather than out of the number of applications filed by
each type of counsel.
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APPENDIX F: OFFENSE SEVERITY
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)
Table 10: Offense Severity: Felony Appeals
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of felony
appeals
388
255
57
700

Percentage of appeals handled
75.19%
75.89%
46.34%
71.79%

Table 11: Offense Severity: Class A Felonies
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of Class-Afelony appeals
30
36
3
69

Percentage of Class-A-felony
appeals handled
05.81%
10.71%
02.44%
07.08%

Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of Class-Bfelony appeals
102
93
14
69

Percentage of Class-B-felony
appeals handled
19.77%
27.68%
11.38%
21.44%
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Table 13: Offense Severity: Class C Felonies
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of Class-Cfelony appeals
130
58
18
69

Percentage of Class-C-felony
appeals handled
25.19%
17.26%
14.63%
21.13%

Table 14: Offense Severity: Class D Felonies
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of Class-Dfelony appeals
126
68
22
216

Percentage handled by each
type
24.42%
20.24%
17.89%
22.15%

Table 15: Offense Severity: Misdemeanor Appeals
Type of
Counsel

Percentage handled by each
type

128
81

24.81%
24.11%

66
700

53.66%
28.21%

Table 16: Offense Severity: Aggravated Misdemeanors
Number of aggravated–
misdemeanor appeals
72
40
30
69

Percentage handled by each
type
13.95%
11.90%
24.39%
14.56%

05/10/2016 12:12:25

Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)
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Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of misdemeanor
appeals
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Table 17: Offense Severity: Serious Misdemeanors
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of serious–
misdemeanor appeals
52
41
31
124

Percentage handled by each
type
10.08%
12.20%
25.20%
12.72%

Table 18: Offense Severity: Simple Misdemeanors
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel types)

Number of Simple–
Misd. appeals
4
0
5
9

Percentage handled by each
type
00.78%
00.00%
04.07%
00.92%
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APPENDIX G: MISCELLANEOUS STATISTICS
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)
Table 19: Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Excluded)212
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases
516
336
123
975

Percentage of all cases in
sample
52.92%
34.46%
12.62%

Table 20: Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Included)
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Pro Se Defendants
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases

Percentage of cases

516
336
123
12
987

52.28%
34.04%
12.46%
01.22%

Table 21: Oral Argument
Number of cases
with oral argument

Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

34
35
21
90

Percentage of cases with
oral argument/all criminal
appeals
06.59%
10.42%
17.07%
9.23%

05/10/2016 12:12:25

212. No statistics calculated for this article include pro se appeals, unless explicitly
noted otherwise. All statistics are calculated based on the 975-case figure calculated in
Table 19: Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Excluded).
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Table 22: Comparison of Iowa and NCSC Data
TypeȱofȱOutcomeȱ
Affirmedȱ
Acquittalȱ
Newȱtrialȱ
ReȬsentencingȱ
Otherȱ

IowaȱOverallȱ
Statisticsȱ
83.59%ȱ
03.08%ȱ
06.05%ȱ
09.33%ȱ
N/A213ȱ

NCSCȱOverallȱStatisticsȱ
79.40%ȱ
01.90%ȱ
06.60%ȱ
07.30%ȱ
04.80%ȱ

Table 23: State/Attorney General As Litigant
Type of
Counsel
Favorable Action on
Defendants’ Appeals
Favorable Action on State’s
Appeal
Sought Further Review
Following Loss in
Defendants’ Appeal
Obtained Further Review
Following Loss in
Defendants’ Appeals

Frequency of event

Rate of event

815

83.59%

14

77.78%

20

12.50%

7

35.00%

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 56 Side B
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213. As discussed in note 63, supra, the tabulation of results in this study differs slightly
from the tabulation of results in the NCSC report. The 4.8 percent “other” result does not
directly correspond to any categorization used in this study.
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Table 24: Retained Cases (2012–2013)
Type of
Counsel
Defendants’ appeals
State’s appeals (and cert.
actions)
Favorable action (for defendant)
in defendants’ appeals
Favorable action (for State) in
State’s appeals
Retained cases filed by appellate
defenders
Retained cases filed by courtapptd. attorneys
Retained cases filed by retained
counsel

Frequency of
event
17
4

Rate of event out of total
retained cases
80.95%
19.05%

9

52.94%

7

25.00%

7

41.18%

6

35.29%

4

25.53%

Table 25: Outcomes of Cases Granted Further Review (2012–2013)
Event

Rate of event

9

39.13%

2

08.70%

23

52.17%
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 57 Side A

Favorable Action (Ct. App.
vacated, district court reversed)
No favorable action (Ct. App.
aff’d, district court aff’d)
Further-review app. mooted
due to defendant’s death
Total applications granted

Frequency of
event
12

05/10/2016 12:12:25
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APPENDIX H: STATISTICS FOR DIRECT APPEALS
(2012–2013, EXCLUDING POSTCONVICTION APPEALS)
Table 26: Favorable Action (Direct Appeals)
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases
with favorable
action
99
25

Number of
Direct Appeals
471
192

Percentage of cases
with favorable
action
21.02%
13.02%

26
150

105
768

24.76%
19.53%

Table 27: Defaults (Direct Appeals)
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases
with defaults
1
42

Number of Direct
Appeals
471
192

Percentage of cases
with defaults
00.21%
21.88%

20
43

105
768

19.05%
05.60%

Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of cases
with stricken
filings
3
61

Number of Direct
Appeals

Percentage of cases
with stricken filings

471
192

00.64%
31.77%

24
64

105
768

22.86%
08.33%
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Table 28: Stricken Filings (Direct Appeals)
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214

Table 29: Further Review Sought Following Loss (Direct Appeals)
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total
(all counsel types)

Number of cases
further review
sought
294
65

Number of Direct
Appeals
372
167

Percentage of cases
further review
sought
79.03%
38.92%

45
404

79
618

56.96%
65.37%

215

Table 30: Further Review Obtained Following Loss (Direct Appeals)
Type of
Counsel

Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total
(all counsel types)

Number of cases
further review
obtained

Number of Direct
Appeals

18
0

372
167

Percentage of
further review
obtained (out of all
losses)
04.84%
00.00%

4
22

79
618

05.06%
03.56%
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 58 Side A
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214. This table tracks only further-review applications following a complete loss (total
affirmance) at the Court of Appeals.
215. This table tracks the rate at which further-review applications were granted out of
all losses for each type of counsel, rather than out of the number of applications filed by
each type of counsel.
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Table 31: Offense Severity: Felony Appeals (Direct Appeals)
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of felony
appeals
350
116
47
513

Percentage of felony appeals
handled by each type
74.31%
60.42%
44.76%
66.80%

Table 32: Offense Severity: Class A Felonies (Direct Appeals)
Type of
Counsel
Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel)

Number of Class-Afelony appeals
24
5
3
32

Percentage of Class-A-felony
appeals handled by each type
05.10%
02.60%
02.86%
04.17%

Table 33: Offense Severity: Misdemeanor Appeals (Direct Appeals)

Appellate Defenders
Court-Appointed Attorneys
Retained Counsel
Total (all counsel types)

Number of
misdemeanor
appeals
121
76
58
255

Percentage of misdemeanor
appeals handled by each type
25.69%
39.58%
55.24%
33.20%
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